Understanding and Managing Risk in Security Systems for the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex

Understanding and Managing Risk in Security Systems for the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex PDF

Author: National Research Council

Publisher: National Academies Press

Published: 2011-04-07

Total Pages: 30

ISBN-13: 0309208874

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A nuclear weapon or a significant quantity of special nuclear material (SNM) would be of great value to a terrorist or other adversary. It might have particular value if acquired from a U.S. facility-in addition to acquiring a highly destructive tool, the adversary would demonstrate an inability of the United States to protect its nuclear assets. The United States expends considerable resources toward maintaining effective security at facilities that house its nuclear assets. However, particularly in a budget-constrained environment, it is essential that these assets are also secured efficiently, meaning at reasonable cost and imposing minimal burdens on the primary missions of the organizations that operate U.S. nuclear facilities. It is in this context that the U.S. Congress directed the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)-a semi-autonomous agency in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) responsible for securing nuclear weapons and significant quantities of SNM-asked the National Academies for advice on augmenting its security approach, particularly on the applicability of quantitative and other risk-based approaches for securing its facilities. In carrying out its charge, the committee has focused on what actions NNSA could take to make its security approach more effective and efficient. The committee concluded that the solution to balancing cost, security, and operations at facilities in the nuclear weapons complex is not to assess security risks more quantitatively or more precisely. This is primarily because there is no comprehensive analytical basis for defining the attack strategies that a malicious, creative, and deliberate adversary might employ or the probabilities associated with them. However, using structured thinking processes and techniques to characterize security risk could improve NNSA's understanding of security vulnerabilities and guide more effective resource allocation.

The State of Security at the Department of Energy's Nuclear Weapons Laboratories

The State of Security at the Department of Energy's Nuclear Weapons Laboratories PDF

Author: Fred Upton

Publisher:

Published: 2001-06-01

Total Pages: 232

ISBN-13: 9780756710996

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Witnesses include: John C. Browne, Dir., Los Alamos National Laboratory; Edward J. Curran, Dir., Office of Counterintelligence, Dept. of Energy (DoE); Eugene E. Habiger, Dir., Office of Security and Emergency Operations, DoE; Glenn S. Podonsky, Dir., Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, DoE; C. Paul Robinson, Pres. and Laboratories Director, Sandia National Laboratories; C. Bruce Tarter, Dir., Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; James Turner, Manager, Oakland Operations Office, DoE; and Gil Weigand, Deputy Assist. Sec., Strategic Computing and Simulation, DoE.

Nuclear Security

Nuclear Security PDF

Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations

Publisher:

Published: 2004

Total Pages: 102

ISBN-13:

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The Quality of Science and Engineering at the NNSA National Security Laboratories

The Quality of Science and Engineering at the NNSA National Security Laboratories PDF

Author: Committee to Review the Quality of the Management and of the Science and Engineering Research at the Department of Energy’s National Security Laboratories--Phase II

Publisher: National Academies Press

Published: 2013-09-24

Total Pages: 58

ISBN-13: 9780309290906

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The three National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) national security laboratories--Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)--are a major component of the U.S. government's laboratory complex and of the national science and technology base. These laboratories are large, diverse, highly respected institutions with broad programs in basic sciences, applied sciences, technology development, and engineering; and they are home to world-class staff and facilities. Under a recent interagency agreement between the Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and the intelligence community, they are evolving to serve the needs of the broad national security community. Despite this broadening of substance and support, these laboratories remain the unique locus of science and engineering (S&E) for the U.S. nuclear weapons program, including, most significantly, the science-based stockpile stewardship program and the S&E basis for analyzing and understanding nuclear weapon developments of other nations and non-state actors. The National Research Council (NRC) was asked by Congress to assess the quality of S&E and the management of S&E at these three laboratories. The Quality of Science and Engineering at the NNSA National Security Laboratories is the second of two reports produced as part of this study. This report assesses the quality of S&E in terms of the capability of the laboratories to perform the necessary tasks to execute the laboratories' missions, both at present and in the future. The report identifies the following as four basic pillars of stockpile stewardship and non-proliferation analysis: (1) the weapons design; (2) systems engineering and understanding of the effects of aging on system performance; (3) weapons science base; and (4) modeling and simulation, which provides a capability to integrate theory, experimental data, and system design. The Quality of Science and Engineering at the NNSA National Security Laboratories offers a snapshot of the present with an eye to the future. This report discusses the current state of S&E and makes recommendations to maintain robust programs.