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Author: Vineeta Yadav
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2016
Total Pages: 333
ISBN-13: 1107083230
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →This book analyzes why some dictators find it in their self-interest to curb corruption.
Author: Christopher Carothers
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2022-04-07
Total Pages: 303
ISBN-13: 1316513289
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Reveals how meaningful corruption control by authoritarian regimes is surprisingly common and follows a different playbook than democratic anti-corruption reform.
Author: Barbara Geddes
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2018-08-23
Total Pages: 275
ISBN-13: 1107115825
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Explains how dictatorships rise, survive, and fall, along with why some but not all dictators wield vast powers.
Author: Shaomin Li
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2019-05-16
Total Pages: 273
ISBN-13: 1108492894
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Drawing on global empirical evidence, Li offers a novel explanation to the age-old puzzle of why some countries thrive despite corruption.
Author: Jennifer Gandhi
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2010-07-26
Total Pages: 0
ISBN-13: 9780521155717
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Often dismissed as window-dressing, nominally democratic institutions, such as legislatures and political parties, play an important role in non-democratic regimes. In a comprehensive cross-national study of all non-democratic states from 1946 to 2002 that examines the political uses of these institutions by dictators, Gandhi finds that legislative and partisan institutions are an important component in the operation and survival of authoritarian regimes. She examines how and why these institutions are useful to dictatorships in maintaining power, analyzing the way dictators utilize institutions as a forum in which to organize political concessions to potential opposition in an effort to neutralize threats to their power and to solicit cooperation from groups outside of the ruling elite. The use of legislatures and parties to co-opt opposition results in significant institutional effects on policies and outcomes under dictatorship.
Author: Daron Acemoglu
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2006
Total Pages: 444
ISBN-13: 9780521855266
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentive to overthrow it. These processes depend on (1) the strength of civil society, (2) the structure of political institutions, (3) the nature of political and economic crises, (4) the level of economic inequality, (5) the structure of the economy, and (6) the form and extent of globalization.
Author: Scott Mainwaring
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2014-01-31
Total Pages: 371
ISBN-13: 1107433630
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →This book presents a new theory for why political regimes emerge, and why they subsequently survive or break down. It then analyzes the emergence, survival and fall of democracies and dictatorships in Latin America since 1900. Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán argue for a theoretical approach situated between long-term structural and cultural explanations and short-term explanations that look at the decisions of specific leaders. They focus on the political preferences of powerful actors - the degree to which they embrace democracy as an intrinsically desirable end and their policy radicalism - to explain regime outcomes. They also demonstrate that transnational forces and influences are crucial to understand regional waves of democratization. Based on extensive research into the political histories of all twenty Latin American countries, this book offers the first extended analysis of regime emergence, survival and failure for all of Latin America over a long period of time.
Author: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita
Publisher: Public Affairs
Published: 2011-09-27
Total Pages: 354
ISBN-13: 161039044X
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Explains the theory of political survival, particularly in cases of dictators and despotic governments, arguing that political leaders seek to stay in power using any means necessary, most commonly by attending to the interests of certain coalitions.
Author: Alaa Al Aswany
Publisher: Haus Publishing
Published: 2019-12-29
Total Pages: 153
ISBN-13: 1912208601
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →The study of dictatorship in the West has acquired an almost exotic dimension. But authoritarian regimes remain a painful reality for billions of people worldwide who still live under them, their freedoms violated and their rights abused. They are subject to arbitrary arrest, torture, corruption, ignorance, and injustice. What is the nature of dictatorship? How does it take hold? In what conditions and circumstances is it permitted to thrive? And how do dictators retain power, even when reviled and mocked by those they govern? In this deeply considered and at times provocative short work, Alaa Al Aswany tells us that, as with any disease, to understand the syndrome of dictatorship we must first consider the circumstances of its emergence, along with the symptoms and complications it causes in both the people and the dictator.
Author: Mr.Joshua Charap
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Published: 1999-07-01
Total Pages: 25
ISBN-13: 1451851499
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →This paper argues that corruption patterns are endogenous to political structures. Thus, corruption can be systemic and planned rather than decentralized and coincidental. In an economic system without law or property rights, a kleptocratic state may arise as a predatory hierarchy from a state of pure anarchy. A dictator minimizes the probability of a palace revolution by creating a system of patronage and loyalty through corrupt bureaucracy. Competitive corruption patterns are associated with anarchy and weak dictators, while strong dictators implement a system of monopolistic corruption. Efforts at public sector reform may meet resistance in countries featuring such systemic corruption.
