Independent Regulatory Commissions

Independent Regulatory Commissions PDF

Author: Ruben Meijer

Publisher: Nova Science Publishers

Published: 2013-07

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13: 9781628081039

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Federal agencies regularly adopt rules, which have the force of law, to implement the statutes and programs authorised by Congress. Unless a statute directs otherwise, agencies generally must follow the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act to promulgate rules. However, beginning with President Reagan, Presidents have maintained a centralised review process for "significant regulatory actions." Currently, Executive Order (EO) 12866, issued by President Clinton, imposes additional procedures agencies must follow before a rule can be finalised. This includes requiring agencies to submit proposed regulatory action to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review. Although EO 12866 applies to executive agencies, independent regulatory commissions (IRCs) are not required to submit their rules to OIRA for review. In the 112th Congress, Senator Rob Portman introduced S.3468, the Independent Regulatory Agency Analysis Act of 2012. Under this bill, the President could issue an executive order establishing centralised review procedures for IRCs. This book discusses the constitutionality and the legal effects of extending centralised review of rulemaking to IRCs.

Regulating Business by Independent Commission

Regulating Business by Independent Commission PDF

Author: Marver H. Bernstein

Publisher: Princeton University Press

Published: 2015-12-08

Total Pages: 319

ISBN-13: 1400878780

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A critical examination of the role of the independent regulatory commissions, attempting to develop a more realistic concept of the process of governmental regulation and to appraise the independent commission as an agent of governmental regulation at the national level. Originally published in 1955. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Independent Agencies in the United States

Independent Agencies in the United States PDF

Author: Professor Marshall J. Breger

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2015-03-30

Total Pages: 456

ISBN-13: 0199350558

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It is essential for anyone involved in law, politics, and government to comprehend the workings of the federal independent regulatory agencies of the United States. Occasionally referred to as the "headless fourth branch of government," these agencies do not fit neatly within any of the three constitutional branches. Their members are appointed for terms that typically exceed those of the President, and cannot be removed from office in the absence of some sort of malfeasance or misconduct. They wield enormous power over the private sector. Independent Agencies in the United States provides a full-length study of the structure and workings of federal independent regulatory agencies in the US, focusing on traditional multi-member agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Federal Trade Commission. It recognizes that the changing kaleidoscope of modern life has led Congress to create innovative and idiosyncratic administrative structures including government corporations, government sponsored enterprises governance, public-private partnerships, systems for "contracting out," self-regulation and incorporation by reference of private standards. In the process, Breger and Edles analyze the general conflict between political accountability and agency independence. They provide a unique comparative review of the internal operations of US agencies and offer contrasts between US, EU, and certain UK independent agencies. Included is a first-of-its-kind appendix describing the powers and procedures of the more than 35 independent US federal agencies, with each supplemented by a selective bibliography.