The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics

The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics PDF

Author: Philippe Aghion

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2015-12-22

Total Pages: 224

ISBN-13: 0190259019

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The 1986 article by Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart titled "A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has provided a formal way to introduce incomplete contracting ideas into economic modeling. The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics collects papers and opinion pieces on the impact that this property right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession.

The Economics of Contracts, second edition

The Economics of Contracts, second edition PDF

Author: Bernard Salanie

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 2017-02-17

Total Pages: 257

ISBN-13: 0262534223

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A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: chapter 7, on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter 8, on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Praise for the previous edition: “The Economics of Contracts offers an excellent introduction to agency models. Written by one of the leading young researchers in contact theory, it is rigorous, clear, concise, and up-to-date. Researchers and students who want to learn about the economics of incentives will want to read this primer.”—Jean Tirole, Institut D'Économie Industrielle, Universite des Sciences Sociales, France “Students will find this a very useful introduction to the ideas of contract theory. Salanié has managed to summarize a large amount of material in a relatively short number of pages in a highly accessible and readable manner.”—Oliver Hart, Professor of Economics, Harvard University

Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure

Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure PDF

Author: Oliver Hart

Publisher: Clarendon Press

Published: 1995-10-05

Total Pages: 244

ISBN-13: 0191521728

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This book provides a framework for thinking about economic instiutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contacting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; optimal bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares. The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers as well as those with an interest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and transitional issues in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed.

More is Less

More is Less PDF

Author: Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2024-05-23

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13: 9781009396073

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Why are contracts incomplete? Transaction costs and bounded rationality cannot be a total explanation since states of the world are often describable, foreseeable, and yet are not mentioned in a contract. Asymmetric information theories also have limitations. We offer an explanation based on 'contracts as reference points'. Including a contingency of the form, 'The buyer will require a good in event E', has a benefit and a cost. The benefit is that if E occurs there is less to argue about; the cost is that the additional reference point provided by the outcome in E can hinder (re)negotiation in states outside E. We show that if parties agree about a reasonable division of surplus, an incomplete contract is strictly superior to a contingent contract. If parties have different views about the division of surplus, an incomplete contract can be superior if including a contingency would lead to divergent reference points.

Contract Theory

Contract Theory PDF

Author: Fouad Sabry

Publisher: One Billion Knowledgeable

Published: 2023-12-15

Total Pages: 324

ISBN-13:

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What is Contract Theory A contract is an institutional arrangement for the movement of resources, which defines the various connections between the parties to a transaction or limits the rights and obligations of the parties. From a legal perspective, a contract is an arrangement that makes it possible for resources to flow differently. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Contract theory Chapter 2: Index of economics articles Chapter 3: Moral hazard Chapter 4: The Market for Lemons Chapter 5: Complete contract Chapter 6: Adverse selection Chapter 7: Information asymmetry Chapter 8: Coase theorem Chapter 9: Incentive Chapter 10: Mechanism design Chapter 11: Principal-agent problem Chapter 12: Efficiency wage Chapter 13: Theory of the firm Chapter 14: Information economics Chapter 15: Personnel economics Chapter 16: Agency cost Chapter 17: Signalling (economics) Chapter 18: Single-crossing condition Chapter 19: Screening (economics) Chapter 20: Incomplete contracts Chapter 21: Multiple principal problem (II) Answering the public top questions about contract theory. (III) Real world examples for the usage of contract theory in many fields. (IV) Rich glossary featuring over 1200 terms to unlock a comprehensive understanding of contract theory. (eBook only). Who will benefit Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of contract theory.

Economic Analysis of the DCFR

Economic Analysis of the DCFR PDF

Author: Filomena Chirico

Publisher: Walter de Gruyter

Published: 2010-03-12

Total Pages: 345

ISBN-13: 3866538553

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The Economic Impact Group (EIG) was created to support the work on the DCFR with insights from law and economics. It brings together a number of leading European law and economics scholars. The Group looked at the main elements of the DCFR with two questions in mind: from an economic perspective, is it sensible to harmonize private law across Europe for this specific element, and is the solution chosen in the DCFR optimal? This book presents the outcome of the work of the EIG. It deals with key issues such as the function of contract law, contract formation, good faith, non-discrimination, specific performance versus damages, standard contractual terms and consumer protection in contract law. The EIG complements the work of the drafters of the DCFR with insightful and critical assessments, based on the well-established law and economics literature.

Contractual Renegotiations and International Investment Arbitration

Contractual Renegotiations and International Investment Arbitration PDF

Author: Aikaterini Florou

Publisher: BRILL

Published: 2020-03-02

Total Pages: 261

ISBN-13: 9004407472

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In Contractual Renegotiations and International Investment Arbitration, Aikaterini Florou explores the complex phenomenon of the renegotiation of investor-state contracts. The author reconstructs the relationship between those contracts and the overarching investment treaties using an original interpretative methodology based on transaction cost economics and relational contract theory.

The Nature of the Firm

The Nature of the Firm PDF

Author: Oliver E. Williamson

Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA

Published: 1993

Total Pages: 260

ISBN-13: 9780195083569

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This volume features a series of essays which arose from a conference on economics, addressing the question: what is the nature of the firm in economic analysis? This paperback edition includes the Nobel Lecture of R.N. Case.