The Endurance of National Constitutions

The Endurance of National Constitutions PDF

Author: Zachary Elkins

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2009-10-19

Total Pages: 271

ISBN-13: 0521515505

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Based on original historical data, this book shows that key changes in design can extend constitutional life.

How to Save a Constitutional Democracy

How to Save a Constitutional Democracy PDF

Author: Tom Ginsburg

Publisher: University of Chicago Press

Published: 2018-10-05

Total Pages: 306

ISBN-13: 022656438X

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Democracies are in danger. Around the world, a rising wave of populist leaders threatens to erode the core structures of democratic self rule. In the United States, the election of Donald Trump marked a decisive turning point for many. What kind of president calls the news media the “enemy of the American people,” or sees a moral equivalence between violent neo-Nazi protesters in paramilitary formation and residents of a college town defending the racial and ethnic diversity of their homes? Yet, whatever our concerns about the current president, we can be assured that the Constitution offers safeguards to protect against lasting damage—or can we? How to Save a Constitutional Democracy mounts an urgent argument that we can no longer afford to be complacent. Drawing on a rich array of other countries’ experiences with democratic backsliding, Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z. Huq show how constitutional rules can either hinder or hasten the decline of democratic institutions. The checks and balances of the federal government, a robust civil society and media, and individual rights—such as those enshrined in the First Amendment—do not necessarily succeed as bulwarks against democratic decline. Rather, Ginsburg and Huq contend, the sobering reality for the United States is that, to a much greater extent than is commonly realized, the Constitution’s design makes democratic erosion more, not less, likely. Its structural rigidity has had the unforeseen consequence of empowering the Supreme Court to fill in some details—often with doctrines that ultimately facilitate rather than inhibit the infringement of rights. Even the bright spots in the Constitution—the First Amendment, for example—may have perverse consequences in the hands of a deft communicator, who can degrade the public sphere by wielding hateful language that would be banned in many other democracies. But we—and the rest of the world—can do better. The authors conclude by laying out practical steps for how laws and constitutional design can play a more positive role in managing the risk of democratic decline.

The Dead Hand's Grip

The Dead Hand's Grip PDF

Author: Adam R. Brown

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2022-08-27

Total Pages: 193

ISBN-13: 0197655300

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In The Dead Hand's Grip, Adam R. Brown examines constitutional specificity--or length--as a new way to evaluate how different polities govern citizens and regulate themselves. As Brown shows, many states and nations bloat their constitutions with procedural and policy details that other polities leave to statutory or regulatory discretion. American state constitutions vary in length from under 9,000 to almost 400,000 words. Constitutional endurance has often provoked fears that the dead hand of the past may reach into the present; lengthy constitutions strengthen the dead hand's grip, binding states to a former generation's solutions to modern problems. Brown argues that excessive constitutional specificity restricts state discretion, with three major results. First, it compels states to rely more frequently on burdensome amendment procedures, increasing constitutional amendment rates. Second, it increases judicial invalidation rates as state supreme courts enforce narrower limits on state action. Third and most importantly, it results in severely reduced economic performance, with lower incomes, higher unemployment, greater inequality, and reduced policy innovativeness generally. In short, long constitutions hurt states. While Brown's analysis focuses on just one set of sub-national constitutions, their broad functions make his thesis relevant to those wanting to understand institutional variation between nations.

Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes

Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes PDF

Author: Tom Ginsburg

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2014

Total Pages: 283

ISBN-13: 1107047668

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This volume explores the form and function of constitutions in countries without the fully articulated institutions of limited government.

Assessing Constitutional Performance

Assessing Constitutional Performance PDF

Author: Tom Ginsburg

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2016-08-30

Total Pages: 447

ISBN-13: 1107154790

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This volume challenges the concept of constitutional success, a bedrock assumption of comparative constitutional scholarship.

Constitution Makers on Constitution Making

Constitution Makers on Constitution Making PDF

Author: Tom Ginsburg

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2022-10-31

Total Pages: 291

ISBN-13: 1108830323

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This edited volume examines constitution-making from the perspective of those directly engaged in the process in different countries around the world.

Comparative Constitutional Design

Comparative Constitutional Design PDF

Author: Tom Ginsburg

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2012-02-27

Total Pages: 407

ISBN-13: 1107020565

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Assesses what we know - and do not know - about comparative constitutional design and particular institutional choices concerning executive power and other issues.

The Cycles of Constitutional Time

The Cycles of Constitutional Time PDF

Author: Jack M. Balkin

Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA

Published: 2020

Total Pages: 257

ISBN-13: 0197530990

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"America's constitutional system evolves through the interplay between three cycles: the rise and fall of dominant political parties, the waxing and waning of political polarization, and alternating episodes of constitutional rot and constitutional renewal. America's politics seems especially fraught today because we are nearing the end of the Republican Party's long political dominance, at the height of a long cycle of political polarization, and suffering from an advanced case of "constitutional rot." Constitutional rot is the historical process through which republics become increasingly less representative and less devoted to the common good. Caused by increasing economic inequality and loss of trust, constitutional rot seriously threatens the constitutional system. But America has been through these cycles before, and will get through them again. America is in a Second Gilded Age slowly moving toward a second Progressive Era, during which polarization will eventually recede. The same cycles shape the work of the federal courts and theories about constitutional interpretation. They explain why political parties have switched sides on judicial review not once but twice in the twentieth century. Polarization and constitutional rot alter the political supports for judicial review, make fights over judicial appointments especially bitter, and encourage constitutional hardball. The Constitution ordinarily relies on the judiciary to protect democracy and to prevent political corruption and self-entrenching behavior. But when constitutional rot is advanced, the Supreme Court is likely to be ineffective and may even make matters worse. Courts cannot save the country from constitutional rot; only political mobilization can"--