The Reason of Rules

The Reason of Rules PDF

Author: Geoffrey Brennan

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2008-08-28

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13: 9780521070904

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Societies function on the basis of rules. These rules, rather like the rules of the road, coordinate the activities of individuals who have a variety of goals and purposes. Whether the rules work well or ill, and how they can be made to work better, is a matter of major concern. Appropriately interpreted, the working of social rules is also the central subject matter of modern political economy. This book is about rules - what they are, how they work, and how they can be properly analysed. The authors' objective is to understand the workings of alternative political institutions so that choices among such institutions (rules) can be more fully informed. Thus, broadly defined, the methodology of constitutional political economy is the subject matter of The Reason of Rules. The authors have examined how rules for political order work, how such rules might be chosen, and how normative criteria for such choices might be established.

Constitutional Economics

Constitutional Economics PDF

Author: Stefan Voigt

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2020-06-18

Total Pages: 153

ISBN-13: 1108486886

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This concise survey of the questions, methods, and empirical findings central to constitutional political economy fills a gap in the literature of political economy. Voigt, a pioneer of the field, demonstrates how constitutional rules affect political economy, appealing to both scholars of the field and readers with no familiarity of the topic.

The Constitution of Political Economy

The Constitution of Political Economy PDF

Author: Adrian Pabst

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2023-06-30

Total Pages: 289

ISBN-13: 1108831095

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This book develops a new conception of political economy at the interface of economic theory and political thought. Political economy is constituted by the interdependence between the economy and the polity that rest on the complex relations of society in which both are embedded. Effective policymaking depends on reflecting this embedding.

The Law of Political Economy

The Law of Political Economy PDF

Author: Poul F. Kjaer

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2020-04-23

Total Pages: 423

ISBN-13: 1108493114

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"Political economy themes have - directly and indirectly - been a central concern of law and legal scholarship ever since political economy emerged as a concept in the early seventeenth century, a development which was re-inforced by the emergence of political economy as an independent area of scholarly enquiry in the eighteenth century, as developed by the French physiocrats. This is not surprising in so far as the core institutions of the economy and economic exchanges, such as property and contract, are legal institutions.In spite of this intrinsic link, political economy discourses and legal discourses dealing with political economy themes unfold in a largely separate manner. Indeed, this book is also a reflection of this, in so far as its core concern is how the law and legal scholarship conceive of and approach political economy issues"--

The Constitution of Markets

The Constitution of Markets PDF

Author: Viktor Vanberg

Publisher: Psychology Press

Published: 2001

Total Pages: 232

ISBN-13: 9780415154710

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This book examines the institutional dimension of markets and the rules and institutions that condition the operation of market economies.

The Economic Effects of Constitutions

The Economic Effects of Constitutions PDF

Author: Torsten Persson

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 2005-01-14

Total Pages: 324

ISBN-13: 9780262661928

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The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric tools to study what they call the "missing link" between constitutional systems and economic policy; the book is an uncompromisingly empirical sequel to their previous theoretical analysis of economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political institutions across countries or time, in a large sample of contemporary democracies. They find that presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less targeted government spending and larger budget deficits. Moreover, the details of the electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence corruption and structural policies toward economic growth.Persson and Tabellini's goal is to draw conclusions about the causal effects of constitutions on policy outcomes. But since constitutions are not randomly assigned to countries, how the constitutional system was selected in the first place must be taken into account. This raises challenging methodological problems, which are addressed in the book. The study is therefore important not only in its findings but also in establishing a methodology for empirical analysis in the field of comparative politics.

The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution

The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution PDF

Author: Joseph Fishkin

Publisher: Harvard University Press

Published: 2022-01-11

Total Pages: 641

ISBN-13: 067498062X

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A bold call to reclaim an American tradition that argues the Constitution imposes a duty on government to fight oligarchy and ensure broadly shared wealth. Oligarchy is a threat to the American republic. When too much economic and political power is concentrated in too few hands, we risk losing the Òrepublican form of governmentÓ the Constitution requires. Today, courts enforce the Constitution as if it has almost nothing to say about this threat. But as Joseph Fishkin and William Forbath show in this revolutionary retelling of constitutional history, a commitment to prevent oligarchy once stood at the center of a robust tradition in American political and constitutional thought. Fishkin and Forbath demonstrate that reformers, legislators, and even judges working in this Òdemocracy of opportunityÓ tradition understood that the Constitution imposes a duty on legislatures to thwart oligarchy and promote a broad distribution of wealth and political power. These ideas led Jacksonians to fight special economic privileges for the few, Populists to try to break up monopoly power, and Progressives to fight for the constitutional right to form a union. During Reconstruction, Radical Republicans argued in this tradition that racial equality required breaking up the oligarchy of slave power and distributing wealth and opportunity to former slaves and their descendants. President Franklin Roosevelt and the New Dealers built their politics around this tradition, winning the fight against the Òeconomic royalistsÓ and Òindustrial despots.Ó But today, as we enter a new Gilded Age, this tradition in progressive American economic and political thought lies dormant. The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution begins the work of recovering it and exploring its profound implications for our deeply unequal society and badly damaged democracy.

Rules and Reason

Rules and Reason PDF

Author: Ram Mudambi

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2001-01-29

Total Pages: 340

ISBN-13: 9780521659598

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This volume explores shifting conceptions of constitutional political economy and suggests possible future strategies for change.

Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective

Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective PDF

Author: Charles Rowley

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2012-12-06

Total Pages: 340

ISBN-13: 9401157286

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Constitutional political economy is a research program that directs inquiry to the working properties of rules and institutions within which individuals interact and to the processes through which these rules and institutions are chosen or come into being. This book makes the case for an approach to constitutional political economy that is grounded in consistent, hard-nosed public choice analysis. Effective institutional design is simply not feasible unless the designers build their structures to withstand rational choice pressures from the political market place. If mean, sensual man is here to stay, then let us, in our better moments, incorporate that knowledge into the institutions that must govern his behavior. A distinguished list of public choice scholars pursue this approach against a varying backcloth of constitutional issues relevant to the United States, Canada, Western Europe, the transition economies and the third world.