Author: Jill Wieber Lens
Publisher:
Published: 2014
Total Pages: 67
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the Supreme Court's most recent opinion on punitive damage awards, the Court declared that the real problem with punitive damage awards is their “stark unpredictability.” The Court abandoned all hope that common law jury instructions could produce predictable punitive damage awards. Instead, the Court suggested pegging punitive damage awards to compensatory damage awards. So far, analysis of the opinion has been minimal, likely due to the purported maritime law basis of the holding.Exxon should not be overlooked, however, as it signals a resurgence of procedural due process as a basis for challenging punitive damage awards -- a type of challenge the Court has not heard since the early 1990s. Predictability of the amount is no different than fair notice of the likely severity of an award, which procedural due process requires. If common law jury instructions cannot produce predictable punitive damage awards, they also cannot produce awards consistent with the notice procedural due process requires. The Court's Exxon pegging solution will not produce predictable awards (and ones that comply with procedural due process) because it relies on compensatory damages, which are inherently unpredictable. As an alternative, this Article suggests looking to restitution, a non-controversial punitive, civil remedy. Basing punitive damages on the defendant's gain would produce predictable awards--as procedural due process requires.
Author: Tom Riley
Publisher: Prentice Hall
Published: 1981
Total Pages: 360
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Author: American Bar Association. Special Committee on Punitive Damages
Publisher:
Published: 1986
Total Pages: 116
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Author: Linda L. Schlueter
Publisher: MICHIE
Published: 1989
Total Pages: 712
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Author: John W. Martin
Publisher:
Published: 2000
Total Pages: 28
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →affirmative defense against punitive damage claims based on reckless conduct of employees, when that conduct is contrary to a firm's good-faith efforts to employ well-designed safety policies and procedures. This article further argues that the so-called "government standards" defense against punitive damages should be defined in a way that both promotes compliance with government standards and helps to assure that the standards provide adequate public safety. This goal could be accomplished by providing that compliance with an applicable federal safety standard constitutes prima facie evidence of good faith and shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff to show, by clear and convincing evidence that either (1) the defendant was guilty of fraud on a regulatory agency; (2) clear advances in the state of the art, implemented after the standard had been adopted but before the defendant's product was designed, had rendered the product obsolete; or (3) the standard itself reflects a flagrant indifference to sa.