Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security

Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security PDF

Author: Jiri Valenta

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2021-01-26

Total Pages: 323

ISBN-13: 1000263673

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This book, first published in 1984, analyses the critically important Cold War issue of the Soviet national security decision-making process dealing with weapons acquisition, arms control and the application of military force. It conceptualises Soviet decision-making for national security from Stalinist antecedents to 1980s modes, and examines the problems of decision-making concerning weapons development, defence research and development and SALT negotiations. It also focuses on the decision-making processes which led to the use or threatened use of military force in Czechoslovakia (1968), the Middle East (1973) and Afghanistan (1979).

The Soviet Quest for Regional Security

The Soviet Quest for Regional Security PDF

Author: Jan Åke Dellenbrant

Publisher:

Published: 1986

Total Pages: 180

ISBN-13:

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This study deals with three cases where the regional security aspect of Soviet decision-making was important. Firstly, the Baltic region will be considered. The Soviet strategy for promoting stability in the Baltic republics has been that of integration. The three republics have become politically and economically firmly integrated with the rest of the Soviet Union. Secondly, Soviet Central Asia will be analyzed. Here, the Soviet leaders decided that an intervention of Afghanistan would be the best measure to counteract alleged foreign influence. The third case deals with Soviet-Polish relations. During the Polish crisis of 1980-81 there was a definite possibility of the Soviet military invasion. One motive for an intervention would have been the destabilizing effects of the Western parts of the USSR that the Polish development had. However, another strategy was chosen, a strategy of non-intervention, namely that of martial law. The concerns for regional security could be studied both at the central and regional level. The republic level first party secretaries who supervise the political stability of their regions constitute an especially interesting source when studying the regional component in the Soviet decision-making. During the Brezhnev period the regional party secretaries became far more active in foreign policy matters than earlier. This fact has largely been overlooked in Western research on the Soviet Union.

No Miracles

No Miracles PDF

Author: Michael R. Fenzel

Publisher: Stanford University Press

Published: 2017-12-05

Total Pages: 175

ISBN-13: 0804799105

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The Soviet experience in Afghanistan provides a compelling perspective on the far-reaching hazards of military intervention. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev decided that a withdrawal from Afghanistan should occur as soon as possible. The Soviet Union's senior leadership had become aware that their strategy was unraveling, their operational and tactical methods were not working, and the sacrifices they were demanding from the Soviet people and military were unlikely to produce the forecasted results. Despite this state of affairs, operations in Afghanistan persisted and four more years passed before the Soviets finally withdrew their military forces. In No Miracles, Michael Fenzel explains why and how that happened, as viewed from the center of the Soviet state. From that perspective, three sources of failure stand out: poor civil-military relations, repeated and rapid turnover of Soviet leadership, and the perception that Soviet global prestige and influence were inexorably tied to the success of the Afghan mission. Fenzel enumerates the series of misperceptions and misjudgments that led to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, tracing the hazards of their military intervention and occupation. Ultimately, he offers a cautionary tale to nation states and policymakers considering military intervention and the use of force.

Analyzing Soviet Strategic Arms Decisions

Analyzing Soviet Strategic Arms Decisions PDF

Author: Karl F. Spielmann

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2019-03-13

Total Pages: 172

ISBN-13: 0429726368

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The importance to Western policymakers of determining the significance of Soviet strategic arms decisions is matched by the difficulty of doing so. The high stakes involved and, in many cases, the inadequacy of evidence can all too easily lead to generalizations that rest more on passionate conviction than on accepted principles of scholarly inquir

The Rise and Fall of National Security Decisionmaking in the Former USSR

The Rise and Fall of National Security Decisionmaking in the Former USSR PDF

Author: Harry Gelman

Publisher: RAND Corporation

Published: 1992-01-01

Total Pages: 77

ISBN-13: 9780833012555

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This report examines the Soviet political-military mechanisms used in the Gorbachev era for national security decisionmaking and explains how the struggle over control of those mechanisms contributed to the events that led to the failed August 1991 coup. The report argues that during the months leading up to the August coup, the leaders of the military-industrial complex discovered that the centrifugal process in the USSR steadily whittled away at their traditional ability to use central institutions to carry out unilateral decisions affecting the republics, and that a prominent motive for the coup was the hope of halting that process by preventing the imminent signing of a union treaty that would formalize a vast further reduction in the degree of influence those leaders enjoyed. The critical issue of the ideological leanings of the actors involved in whatever new supreme institutions for national security coordinating and decisionmaking eventually reemerge in Russia was underscored in the spring of 1992 by disturbing signs that Yeltsin was coming under increasing pressure to make concessions to the traditionally dominant forces in the military institution.

Managing National Security Policy

Managing National Security Policy PDF

Author: William W. Newmann

Publisher: University of Pittsburgh Pre

Published: 2010-06-15

Total Pages: 300

ISBN-13: 9780822970767

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The U.S. national security decision-making system is a product of the Cold War. Formed in 1947 with the National Security Council, it developed around the demands of competing with and containing the USSR. But the world after the collapse of communism and, particularly, the tragedy of September 11, is vastly different. A threatening but familiar enemy has given way to a complex environment of more diverse and less predictable threats. As the creation of the Homeland Security Council and Office of Homeland Security indicate, the United States must now reevaluate standard national security processes for this more uncertain world.In this timely book, William W. Newmann examines the way presidents manage their advisory process for national security decision making and the way that process evolves over the course of an administration's term. Three detailed case studies show how the president and his senior advisors managed arms control and nuclear strategy during the first terms of the Carter, Reagan, and G. H. W. Bush presidencies. These studies, enhanced by interviews with key members of the national security teams, including James Baker, Brent Scowcroft, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, reveal significant patterns of structure and adaptation. They provide a window to how decision making in the modern White House really works, at a moment when national security decisions are again at the top of the agenda.Specifically, Newmann investigates this pattern. Each president begins his administration with a standard National Security Councilÿbased interagency process, which he then streamlines toward a reliance on senior officials working in small groups, and a confidence structure of a few key advisors. Newmann examines the institutional pressures that push administrations in this direction, as he also weighs the impact of the leadership styles of the presidents themselves. In so doing, he reaches the conclusion that decision making can be an audition process through which presidents discover which advisors they trust. And the most successful process is one that balances formal, informal, and confidence sources to maintain full discussion of diverse opinions, while settling those debates informally at the senior-most levels.Unlike previous studies, Managing National Security Policy views decision making as dynamic, rather than as a static system inaugurated at the beginning of a president's term. The key to understanding the decision-making process rests upon the study of the evolving relationships between the president and his senior advisors. Awareness of this evolution paints a complex portrait of policy making, which may help future presidents design national security decision structures that fit the realities of the office in today's world.