Putting Auction Theory to Work
Author: Paul Robert Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2004-01-12
Total Pages: 396
ISBN-13: 9780521536721
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Table of contents
Author: Paul Robert Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2004-01-12
Total Pages: 396
ISBN-13: 9780521536721
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Table of contents
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Columbia University Press
Published: 2017-05-23
Total Pages: 222
ISBN-13: 023154457X
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Traditional economic theory studies idealized markets in which prices alone can guide efficient allocation, with no need for central organization. Such models build from Adam Smith’s famous concept of an invisible hand, which guides markets and renders regulation or interference largely unnecessary. Yet for many markets, prices alone are not enough to guide feasible and efficient outcomes, and regulation alone is not enough, either. Consider air traffic control at major airports. While prices could encourage airlines to take off and land at less congested times, prices alone do just part of the job; an air traffic control system is still indispensable to avoid disastrous consequences. With just an air traffic controller, however, limited resources can be wasted or poorly used. What’s needed in this and many other real-world cases is an auction system that can effectively reveal prices while still maintaining enough direct control to ensure that complex constraints are satisfied. In Discovering Prices, Paul Milgrom—the world’s most frequently cited academic expert on auction design—describes how auctions can be used to discover prices and guide efficient resource allocations, even when resources are diverse, constraints are critical, and market-clearing prices may not even exist. Economists have long understood that externalities and market power both necessitate market organization. In this book, Milgrom introduces complex constraints as another reason for market design. Both lively and technical, Milgrom roots his new theories in real-world examples (including the ambitious U.S. incentive auction of radio frequencies, whose design he led) and provides economists with crucial new tools for dealing with the world’s growing complex resource-allocation problems.
Author: Paul R. Milgrom
Publisher:
Published: 2013
Total Pages: 0
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →I review the uses of economic theory in the initial design and later improvement of the "simultaneous ascending auction," which was developed initially for the sale of radio spectrum licenses in the United States. I analyze some capabilities and limitations of the auction, the roles of various detailed rules, the possibilities for introducing combinatorial bidding, and some considerations in adapting the auction for sales in which revenue, rather than efficiency, is the primary goal.
Author: Martin Bichler
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2017-10-26
Total Pages: 935
ISBN-13: 1107135346
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.
Author: Paul Klemperer
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2004-03-28
Total Pages: 262
ISBN-13: 0691119252
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions make up many of the world's most important markets; and this book describes how auction theory has also become an invaluable tool for understanding economics. Auctions: Theory and Practice provides a non-technical introduction to auction theory, and emphasises its practical application. Although there are many extremely successful auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. He discusses the successes and failures of the one-hundred-billion dollar "third-generation" mobile-phone license auctions; he, jointly with Ken Binmore, designed the first of these. Klemperer also demonstrates the surprising power of auction theory to explain seemingly unconnected issues such as the intensity of different forms of industrial competition, the costs of litigation, and even stock trading 'frenzies' and financial crashes. Engagingly written, the book makes the subject exciting not only to economics students but to anyone interested in auctions and their role in economics.
Author: Maarten Christiaan Wilhelmus Janssen
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2004
Total Pages: 340
ISBN-13: 9780521537575
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →In many countries all over the world, governments are privatising firms that were previously under public control. This is happening, for example, in public utility sectors such as gas, water and electricity, in transport sectors (such as rail and metro) and in radio and telephony. This book provides an overview of the economic issues that are involved in this transfer of ownership of public assets. Combining a theoretical framework with a set of case studies of recent sales of state-owned assets from Europe and the USA, it asks which sort of allocation mechanism can a government adopt? Which is most suited to a particular sale? And how will the choice of allocation mechanism affect future market outcomes? With contributions from international experts, this book offers an accessible introduction to auction theory and an invaluable, non-technical analysis of existing knowledge. It will be of interest to students, non-specialists and policy-makers alike.
Author: David J. Salant
Publisher: MIT Press
Published: 2014-12-19
Total Pages: 199
ISBN-13: 0262028263
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →A guide to modeling and analyzing auctions, with the applications of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction decision making. Auctions are highly structured market transactions primarily used in thin markets (markets with few participants and infrequent transactions). In auctions, unlike most other markets, offers and counteroffers are typically made within a structure defined by a set of rigid and comprehensive rules. Because auctions are essentially complex negotiations that occur within a fully defined and rigid set of rules, they can be analyzed by game theoretic models more accurately and completely than can most other types of market transactions. This book offers a guide for modeling, analyzing, and predicting the outcomes of auctions, focusing on the application of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction design and decision making. After a brief introduction to fundamental concepts from game theory, the book explains some of the more significant results from the auction theory literature, including the revenue (or payoff) equivalence theorem, the winner's curse, and optimal auction design. Chapters on auction practice follow, addressing collusion, competition, information disclosure, and other basic principles of auction management, with some discussion of auction experiments and simulations. Finally, the book covers auction experience, with most of the discussion centered on energy and telecommunications auctions, which have become the proving ground for many new auction designs. A clear and concise introduction to auctions, auction design, and auction strategy, this Primer will be an essential resource for students, researchers, and practitioners.
Author: Flavio M. Menezes
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Published: 2005
Total Pages: 200
ISBN-13: 0199275998
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of auction theory and aims to provide an introductory treatment to allow students to work through all the basic results. The techniques and insights gained provide a useful starting point for those wanting to venture into information economics, mechanism design and regulatory economics.
Author: John G. Riley
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2012-09-10
Total Pages: 717
ISBN-13: 0521827477
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Essential Microeconomics is designed to help students deepen their understanding of the core theory of microeconomics. Unlike other texts, this book focuses on the most important ideas and does not attempt to be encyclopedic. Two-thirds of the textbook focuses on price theory. As well as taking a new look at standard equilibrium theory, there is extensive examination of equilibrium under uncertainty, the capital asset pricing model, and arbitrage pricing theory. Choice over time is given extensive coverage and includes a basic introduction to control theory. The final third of the book, on game theory, provides a comprehensive introduction to models with asymmetric information. Topics such as auctions, signaling, and mechanism design are made accessible to students who have a basic rather than a deep understanding of mathematics. There is ample use of examples and diagrams to illustrate issues as well as formal derivations. Essential Microeconomics is designed to help students deepen their understanding of the core theory of microeconomics.