The Knowledge Argument

The Knowledge Argument PDF

Author: Sam Coleman

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2019-09-19

Total Pages: 313

ISBN-13: 1107141990

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A cutting-edge and groundbreaking set of new essays by top philosophers on key topics related to the ever-influential knowledge argument.

Consciousness Revisited

Consciousness Revisited PDF

Author: Michael Tye

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 2011-08-19

Total Pages: 249

ISBN-13: 0262261227

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Four major puzzles of consciousness philosophical materialism must confront after rejecting the phenomenal concept strategy. We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? To defend materialism, philosophical materialists have formulated what is sometimes called "the phenomenal-concept strategy," which holds that we possess a range of special concepts for classifying the subjective aspects of our experiences. In Consciousness Revisited, the philosopher Michael Tye, until now a proponent of the the phenomenal-concept strategy, argues that the strategy is mistaken. A rejection of phenomenal concepts leaves the materialist with the task of finding some other strategy for defending materialism. Tye points to four major puzzles of consciousness that arise: How is it possible for Mary, in the famous thought experiment, to make a discovery when she leaves her black-and-white room? In what does the explanatory gap consist and how can it be bridged? How can the hard problem of consciousness be solved? How are zombies possible? Tye presents solutions to these puzzles—solutions that relieve the pressure on the materialist created by the failure of the phenomenal-concept strategy. In doing so, he discusses and makes new proposals on a wide range of issues, including the nature of perceptual content, the conditions necessary for consciousness of a given object, the proper understanding of change blindness, the nature of phenomenal character and our awareness of it, whether we have privileged access to our own experiences, and, if we do, in what such access consists.

Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness

Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness PDF

Author: John Perry

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 2001

Total Pages: 244

ISBN-13: 9780262661355

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Physicalism is the idea that if everything that goes on is physical, our consciousness and feelings must also be physical. This book defends a view called antecedent physicalism.

Consciousness and Fundamental Reality

Consciousness and Fundamental Reality PDF

Author: Philip Goff

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2017

Total Pages: 305

ISBN-13: 0190677015

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The first half of this book argues that physicalism cannot account for consciousness, and hence cannot be true. The second half explores and defends Russellian monism, a radical alternative to both physicalism and dualism. The view that emerges combines panpsychism with the view that the universe as a whole is fundamental.

Thinking about Consciousness

Thinking about Consciousness PDF

Author: David Papineau

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2002

Total Pages: 281

ISBN-13: 0199243824

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Thinking About Consciousness is a discussion of recent physicalist ideas about consciousness, written in an accessible style by David Papineau.

There's Something About Mary

There's Something About Mary PDF

Author: Peter Ludlow

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 2004-11-19

Total Pages: 488

ISBN-13: 9780262621892

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In Frank Jackson's famous thought experiment, Mary is confined to a black-and-white room and educated through black-and-white books and lectures on a black-and-white television. In this way, she learns everything there is to know about the physical world. If physicalism—the doctrine that everything is physical—is true, then Mary seems to know all there is to know. What happens, then, when she emerges from her black-and-white room and sees the color red for the first time? Jackson's knowledge argument says that Mary comes to know a new fact about color, and that, therefore, physicalism is false. The knowledge argument remains one of the most controversial and important arguments in contemporary philosophy.There's Something About Mary—the first book devoted solely to the argument—collects the main essays in which Jackson presents (and later rejects) his argument along with key responses by other philosophers. These responses are organized around a series of questions: Does Mary learn anything new? Does she gain only know-how (the ability hypothesis), or merely get acquainted with something she knew previously (the acquaintance hypothesis)? Does she learn a genuinely new fact or an old fact in disguise? And finally, does she really know all the physical facts before her release, or is this a "misdescription"? The arguments presented in this comprehensive collection have important implications for the philosophy of mind and the study of consciousness.

Physicalism

Physicalism PDF

Author: Daniel Stoljar

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2010-04-05

Total Pages: 265

ISBN-13: 1135149224

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Physicalism, the thesis that everything is physical, is one of the most important yet divisive problems in philosophy. In this superb introduction to the problem Daniel Stoljar focuses on three fundamental questions: the interpretation, truth and philosophical significance of physicalism.

The Knowledge Argument and Phenomenal Concepts

The Knowledge Argument and Phenomenal Concepts PDF

Author: Luca Malatesti

Publisher: Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Published: 2012-12-19

Total Pages: 160

ISBN-13: 1443844403

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There is widespread debate in contemporary philosophy of mind over the place of conscious experiences in the natural world – where the latter is taken to be broadly as described and explained by such sciences as physics, chemistry and biology; while conscious experiences encompass pains, bodily sensations, perceptions, feelings and moods. Many philosophers and scientists, who endorse physicalism or materialism, maintain that these mental states can be completely described and explained in natural terms. Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument is a very influential objection to physicalism and, thus, to such an optimistic view about the scientific treatability of conscious experiences. According to the knowledge argument, we can know facts about our colour experiences that are not physical facts. At the heart of this book lies a response to the knowledge argument that aims to defend a version of physicalism, that the author calls modest reductionism. This reply is based on the endorsement of the phenomenal concept strategy. According to this response, the knowledge argument cannot prove that there are non-physical facts. Instead, it can only show that there are ways of thinking about colour experiences that are based on phenomenal concepts that differ from scientific concepts. The author argues for the superiority of the phenomenal concept strategy over other influential physicalist replies to the knowledge argument. However, he criticises some recent physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts and develops his own distinctive theory of these concepts.