News and Sovereign Default Risk in Small Open Economies

News and Sovereign Default Risk in Small Open Economies PDF

Author: Ceyhun Bora Durdu

Publisher: DIANE Publishing

Published: 2010-11

Total Pages: 24

ISBN-13: 1437939147

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This paper builds a model of sovereign debt in which default risk, interest rates, and debt depend not only on current fundamentals but also on news about future fundamentals. News shocks (NS) affect equilibrium outcomes because they contain info. about the future ability of the gov¿t. to repay its debt. First, in the model with NS not all defaults occur in bad times. Second, the NS help account for key differences between emerging markets and developed economies: as the precision of the news improves the model predicts lower variability of consumption, less counter-cyclical trade balance and interest rate spreads. Finally, the model also captures the hump-shaped relationship between default rates and the precision of news obtained from the data.

Essays on Modelling the Sovereign Default Risk

Essays on Modelling the Sovereign Default Risk PDF

Author: Sébastien Villemot

Publisher:

Published: 2012

Total Pages: 316

ISBN-13:

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This thesis contributes to the literature on sovereign debt and default risk, building on theoretical models of strategic default and on more recent developments of the quantitative sovereign debt literature. The first contribution is to suggest a solution to the "sovereign default puzzle:" most quantitative sovereign debt models predict a default at very low debt-to-GDP thresholds, in clear contradiction with what is observed in the data. Starting from the observation that countries generally do not want to default but are rather forced into it by the markets, I present a model which can replicate the key stylized facts regarding sovereign risk. As another contribution, I establish a typology of debt crises in three categories: those crises that are the consequence of exogenous shocks, those that are self-fulfilling prophecies, and those self-enforcing crises that are the consequence of a rational tendency to over-borrow when the risk of a negative shock is high. The estimated proportion of self-fulfilling and self-enforcing crises in the data is about 10% in each case. I also study how sovereign default can be understood in the context of small open economy real business cycle models. The conclusion is that these models oscillate between two polar cases: default is either inexistent or too frequent, depending on the chosen parameter values. These models are therefore not well suited for studying sovereign risk, and default needs to be fully endogeneized in order to get meaningful results. Finally, I make a methodological contribution by presenting a new computational method for solving endogenous default models. It is shown to dramatically improve the existing speed-accuracy frontier.

A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Default and Business Cycles

A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Default and Business Cycles PDF

Author: Vivian Z. Yue

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2011-07-01

Total Pages: 32

ISBN-13: 1462330452

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Emerging markets business cycle models treat default risk as part of an exogenous interest rate on working capital, while sovereign default models treat income fluctuations as an exogenous endowment process with ad-noc default costs. We propose instead a general equilibrium model of both sovereign default and business cycles. In the model, some imported inputs require working capital financing; default on public and private obligations occurs simultaneously. The model explains several features of cyclical dynamics around default triggers an efficiency loss as these inputs are replaced by imperfect substitutes; and default on public and private obligations occurs simultaneously. The model explains several features of cyclical dynamics around deraults, countercyclical spreads, high debt ratios, and key business cycle moments.

Essays on Sovereign Default

Essays on Sovereign Default PDF

Author:

Publisher:

Published: 2013

Total Pages: 78

ISBN-13:

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This dissertation consists of three independent essays on sovereign default. In the first chapter, I develop a quantitative general equilibrium model of sovereign default to account for spillover of default risk across countries. When the collateral constraint for investors binds due to a decrease in the value of collateral, triggered by a high default risk for one country, credit constrained investors ask for liquidity premiums even to countries with normal fundamentals. This increase in the cost of borrowing increases incentives to default for the other countries with normal fundamentals, further constraining investors in obtaining credit through a decrease in the value of collateral. The quantitative results show that this model can generate spillover of default risk across countries. The essay in the second chapter introduces endogenous capital accumulation to a quantitative model of sovereign default based on Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). With a production technology in the model, output and interest rates are jointly determined by the interaction between a sovereign government who can optimally default and foreign creditors taking into account default risk. Adding investment enables the model to generate unique economic dynamics similar to those observed around emerging economies' default crises: (1) Emerging economies' debt crises display a boom-bust pattern. (2) A non-negligible fraction of sovereign defaults occur in good times. The essay in the third chapter explains why emerging economies borrow abroad in foreign currency. We present a two-period model in which foreign lenders offer a small open economy an optimal self-enforcing contract in which borrowing is denominated in borrowers' currency. Taking into account the government's incentive to inflate away the debt, the optimal lending contract provides consumption insurance for the economy in that the contract allows the economy for inflation in bad times but asks for deflation in good times. As the variance of income shocks for the economy increases, it gets more difficult for the contract to satisfy the incentive compatible constraints at the good income state. The numerical results are consistent with the fact that emerging economies with high income volatility suffer from "Original Sin".

Essays on Sovereign Default

Essays on Sovereign Default PDF

Author: JungJae Park

Publisher:

Published: 2013

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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This dissertation consists of three independent essays on sovereign default. In the first chapter, I develop a quantitative general equilibrium model of sovereign default to account for spillover of default risk across countries. When the collateral constraint for investors binds due to a decrease in the value of collateral, triggered by a high default risk for one country, credit constrained investors ask for liquidity premiums even to countries with normal fundamentals. This increase in the cost of borrowing increases incentives to default for the other countries with normal fundamentals, further constraining investors in obtaining credit through a decrease in the value of collateral. The quantitative results show that this model can generate spillover of default risk across countries. The essay in the second chapter introduces endogenous capital accumulation to a quantitative model of sovereign default based on Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). With a production technology in the model, output and interest rates are jointly determined by the interaction between a sovereign government who can optimally default and foreign creditors taking into account default risk. Adding investment enables the model to generate unique economic dynamics similar to those observed around emerging economies' default crises: (1) Emerging economies' debt crises display a boom-bust pattern. (2) A non-negligible fraction of sovereign defaults occur in good times. The essay in the third chapter explains why emerging economies borrow abroad in foreign currency. We present a two-period model in which foreign lenders offer a small open economy an optimal self-enforcing contract in which borrowing is denominated in borrowers' currency. Taking into account the government's incentive to inflate away the debt, the optimal lending contract provides consumption insurance for the economy in that the contract allows the economy for inflation in bad times but asks for deflation in good times. As the variance of income shocks for the economy increases, it gets more difficult for the contract to satisfy the incentive compatible constraints at the good income state. The numerical results are consistent with the fact that emerging economies with high income volatility suffer from "Original Sin".

Sovereign Risk and Macroeconomic Fluctuations

Sovereign Risk and Macroeconomic Fluctuations PDF

Author:

Publisher:

Published: 2004

Total Pages:

ISBN-13:

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This dissertation investigates the properties of macroeconomic fluctuations in a small open economy under the presence of sovereign default risk. International borrowing and lending arise from the interaction between a risk averse sovereign representative agent in a small open economy trying to self insure against idiosyncratic shocks and risk neutral international lenders. The credit market is imperfect because the country cannot commit to repay its outstanding debt and chooses to default when it is optimal to do so. The possibility of default induces an endogenous sovereign risk premium on foreign debt and endogenous rationing by foreign creditors. The second chapter presents a simple model of sovereign risk that explains how default can de triggered by shocks that drive normal business cycles, albeit in the context of an endowment economy. The model features incomplete external financial markets and the inability of the sovereign country to commit to repay debts. These two features coupled with risk neutral international lenders generate an endogenous risk premium and an endogenous borrowing constraint that drive the dynamics of default. The model is calibrated to the Argentine economy. It is able to reproduce counter-cyclical country risk spreads, large capital outflows during Sudden Stops, and default. In a simple experiment conducted here, it is shown that by increasing trade sanctions to the artificial economy, it is possible to deter default but it is not possible to isolate the economy from the occurrence of Sudden Stops. Despite this, the welfare gains from eliminating default are very large: 7\% of steady state consumption. Using numerical methods, this paper also proposes an algorithm for the solution of this family of models that allows to generalize the results of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) into environments with varying degrees of persistence and volatility in the underlying stochastic income process. In the third chapter the assumption of an endowmen.

Sovereign Debt

Sovereign Debt PDF

Author: S. Ali Abbas

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2019-10-21

Total Pages: 288

ISBN-13: 0192591398

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The last time global sovereign debt reached the level seen today was at the end of the Second World War, and this shaped a generation of economic policymaking. International institutions were transformed, country policies were often draconian and distortive, and many crises ensued. By the early 1970s, when debt fell back to pre-war levels, the world was radically different. It is likely that changes of a similar magnitude -for better and for worse - will play out over coming decades. Sovereign Debt: A Guide for Economists and Practitioners is an attempt to build some structure around the issues of sovereign debt to help guide economists, practitioners and policymakers through this complicated, but not intractable, subject. Sovereign Debt brings together some of the world's leading researchers and specialists in sovereign debt to cover a range of sub-disciplines within this vast topic. It explores debt management with debt sustainability; debt reduction policies with crisis prevention policies; and the history with the conjuncture. It is a foundation text for all those interested in sovereign debt, with a particular focus real world examples and issues.

Managing the Sovereign-Bank Nexus

Managing the Sovereign-Bank Nexus PDF

Author: Mr.Giovanni Dell'Ariccia

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2018-09-07

Total Pages: 54

ISBN-13: 1484359623

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This paper reviews empirical and theoretical work on the links between banks and their governments (the bank-sovereign nexus). How significant is this nexus? What do we know about it? To what extent is it a source of concern? What is the role of policy intervention? The paper concludes with a review of recent policy proposals.

Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010

Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010 PDF

Author: Mr.Udaibir S. Das

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2012-08-01

Total Pages: 128

ISBN-13: 1475505531

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This paper provides a comprehensive survey of pertinent issues on sovereign debt restructurings, based on a newly constructed database. This is the first complete dataset of sovereign restructuring cases, covering the six decades from 1950–2010; it includes 186 debt exchanges with foreign banks and bondholders, and 447 bilateral debt agreements with the Paris Club. We present new stylized facts on the outcome and process of debt restructurings, including on the size of haircuts, creditor participation, and legal aspects. In addition, the paper summarizes the relevant empirical literature, analyzes recent restructuring episodes, and discusses ongoing debates on crisis resolution mechanisms, credit default swaps, and the role of collective action clauses.

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