Author:
Publisher:
Published: 1983
Total Pages: 146
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →In October 1981, the Administration announced its plan to modernize all parts of the U.S. strategic deterrent. Representing the most comprehensive and far-reaching such effort in the past 20 years, the plan would expand and upgrade the triad of strategic "offensive" forces: land-based and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles plus long-range bombers. It would also improve the triad's communications and control systems, and strengthen U.S. defenses against attack by Soviet bombers. U.S. strategic forces are primarily intended to deter the Soviet Union from initiating a nuclear war. To do so, they must be able to survive a Soviet nuclear strike and retaliate in an appropriate and timely manner. In recent years, the Soviets have expanded and improved their strategic forces. The Administration apparently believes that in response the United States must increase not only the numbers of its forces and their chance of surviving a Soviet strike, but also their destructive capability, endurance, and responsiveness. The broad scope of the buildup and the relative share of the nation's resources to be devoted to defense in general has sparked debate, as has the high cost of individual weapons systems. Most recently, debate has centered on the Administration's proposal to deploy the MX missile. This study assesses the scope and costs of the Administration's planned modernization, taking into consideration the effects that arms control agreements could have on it. The study also considers proposals to modify the Administration's program by (1) dropping the MX missile, (2) focusing modernization efforts on submarine-based missiles rather than land-based missiles, or (3) terminating the B-1B bomber program in favor of improving existing bomber capability.
Author:
Publisher:
Published: 1987
Total Pages: 120
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →United States strategic forces are primarily intended to deter the Soviet Union from initiating a nuclear war. To do so, U.S. policy calls for them to be able to survive a Soviet nuclear strike and retaliate in an appropriate and timely manner. Since the 1960s, the Soviets have upgraded and significantly expanded the capabilities of their strategic forces. The Administration believes that in response the United States must increase not only the numbers of its forces and their chance of surviving a Soviet strike, but also their destructive capability, endurance, and responsiveness. Indeed, modernizing and upgrading the strategic forces and their associated command and control has been one of the highest priorities of the Administration's defense program. The Administration has already substantially completed one wave of strategic procurement, including the first 50 MX missiles to be placed in existing silos, B-1B bombers, and the majority of new Trident submarines. When fully fielded, these systems will increase available strategic warheads by roughly 25 percent above 1981 funded warhead levels. The Administration plans a second wave of procurement that may well cost more than the first. The broad scope of the program, coupled with its substantial cost and limits on Congressional willingness to increase total defense spending, is likely to generate sharp debate.
Author: United States. Congressional Budget Office
Publisher:
Published: 1987
Total Pages:
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Author: United States. Congressional Budget Office
Publisher:
Published:
Total Pages: 0
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Author: Kevin Neil Lewis
Publisher:
Published: 1986
Total Pages: 28
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →"This paper discusses transition aspects of both offensive and defensive forces should the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) continue. The author argues that it would be to the advantage of the United States to maintain its current offensive orientation in parallel with defensive developments until the strategic competition enters a fundamentally different (and final) defensive deployment phase. Four key issues discussed are: (1) potential interactions between major new homeland defenses and those parts of U.S. and NATO strategy that incorporate less than all-out nuclear employment options; (2) defense suppression and how the United States schedules its SDI deployment options; (3) certain budgetary and management considerations; and (4) reasons the United States should maintain powerful offensive forces until relatively late in the homeland defense deployment game."--Rand abstracts.
Author: Amy F. Woolf
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
Published: 2009-11
Total Pages: 27
ISBN-13: 1437920438
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Contents: (1) Introduction; (2) Background: The Strategic Triad: Force Structure and Size During the Cold War; Force Structure and Size After the Cold War; Future Force Structure and Size; (3) Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles: Ongoing Plans and Programs: (a) Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles: Peacekeeper; Minuteman III; Minuteman Modernization Programs; Future Programs; (b) Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles: The SSGN Program; The Backfit Program; Basing Changes; Warhead Issues; Modernization Plans and Programs; Future Programs; (c) Bombers: B-1 Bomber; B-2 Bomber; B-52 Bomber; Future Bomber Plans; (4) Issues for Congress: Force Size; Force Structure; Safety, Security, and Management Issues. Illustrations.
Author: Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the
Publisher: CreateSpace
Published: 2015-06-12
Total Pages: 88
ISBN-13: 9781514313633
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →According to the Missile Defense Agency, "there has been an increase of over 1,200 additional ballistic missiles over the last 5 years. The total of ballistic missiles outside the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Russia and China has risen over 5,900. Hundreds of launchers and missiles are currently within the range of our deployed forces today." Russia and China are both engaged in aggressive modernization programs pointing hundreds of missiles of all sizes and ranges at the U.S., its allies, and our deployed forces. From the outset, the Obama administration substantially reduced the funding for missile defense and particularly for those capabilities that were to provide for the protection of the American territory and population centers. While U.S. strategic defenses have been reduced in numbers, and capabilities for the future have been abandoned, the threat to the U.S. homeland has grown, not just from North Korea and Iran, but from Putin's Russia, which has embarked on a strategic build-up of offensive and missile defense capabilities reminiscent of the Soviet days.