Lanterna Rally

Author: Meir Finkel

Publisher: Stanford University Press

Published: 2011-02-28

Total Pages: 469

ISBN-13: 0804777152

“An outstanding work. Inculcating adaptability, flexibility, and responsiveness to surprise is the chief preoccupation of the major armies of the world.” —David Betz, Department of War Studies, King’s College London This book addresses one of the basic questions in military studies: How can armies cope effectively with technological and doctrinal surprises—ones that leave them vulnerable to new weapons systems and/or combat doctrines? Author Meir Finkel contends that the current paradigm—with its over-dependence on intelligence and an all-out effort to predict the nature of the future battlefield and the enemy’s capabilities—generally doesn’t work. Based on historical case analysis of successful “under-fire” recovery and failure to recover, he identifies the variables that have determined these outcomes, and he presents an innovative method for military force planning that will enables armies to deal with the uncertainties of future wars “in real time.” His proposed method combines conceptual, doctrinal, cognitive, command, organizational, and technological elements to produce optimal battlefield flexibility and adaptability. He then demonstrates that, when properly applied, this method can eliminate most obstacles to overcoming battlefield surprises. “[A] thoroughly researched and objective work of events impacting America’s military affairs and security policies.” —Parameters “Originally published in Israel in 2007, this thoughtful work by Col. Finkel (IDF) looks at how modern military forces have coped with surprise in terms of innovative technologies, techniques, or tactics.” —A. A. Nofi, StrategyPage.com “This book combines solid history and an innovative analytical structure. It begins to fill in a serious hole in our understanding of flexibility or what could better be called ‘adaptation under fire.’ It is strongly recommended for senior military leaders and students of military innovation and force planning.” —Frank Hoffman, Journal of Military History