Market Discipline in Banking Reconsidered

Market Discipline in Banking Reconsidered PDF

Author: Daniel M. Covitz

Publisher:

Published: 2004

Total Pages: 64

ISBN-13:

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"We find that the risk-sensitivity of bank holding company subordinated debt spreads at issuance increased with regulatory reforms that were designed to reduce conjectural government guarantees, but declined somewhat with subsequent reforms that were aimed in part at reducing regulatory forbearance. In addition, we test and find evidence for a straightforward form of "market discipline:" The extent to which bond issuance penalizes relatively risky banks. Evidence for such discipline only appears in the periods after conjectural government guarantees were reduced"--Abstract.

Market Discipline Across Countries and Industries

Market Discipline Across Countries and Industries PDF

Author: C. E. V. Borio

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 2004

Total Pages: 472

ISBN-13: 9780262025751

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Leading academics and policymakers address the theory of market discipline and consider evidence across different industries and countries. The effectiveness of market discipline -- the strong built-in incentives that encourage banks and financial systems to operate soundly and efficiently -- commands much attention today, particularly in light of recent accounting scandals. As government discipline, in the form of regulation, seems to grows less effective as the banking industry and financial markets grow more complex, the role of market discipline becomes increasingly important. In this collection, which grew out of a conference cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland, a diverse group of academics and policymakers address different aspects of the ability of market discipline to affect corporate behavior and performance. A major purpose of the book is to develop evidence on how market discipline operates across non-government regulated industries and in different countries, how successful it has been, and how it may transfer to a regulated industry. The chapters examine such topics as the theory of market discipline, evidence of market discipline in banking and other industries, evidence of market discipline for countries, the current state of corporate governance, and the interaction of market discipline and public policy.

Reconsidering Bank Capital Regulation

Reconsidering Bank Capital Regulation PDF

Author: Connel Fullenkamp

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2014-09-15

Total Pages: 36

ISBN-13: 1498309763

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Despite revisions to bank capital standards, fundamental shortcomings remain: the rules for setting capital requirements need to be simpler, and resolution should be an essential part of the capital requirement framework.We propose a new system of capital regulation that addresses these needs by making changes to all three pillars of bank regulation: only common equity should be recognized as capital for regulatory purposes, and risk weighting of assets should be abandoned; capital requirements should be assigned on an institution-by-institution basis according to a regulatory (s,S) approach developed in the paper; a standard for prompt, corrective action is incorporated into the (s,S) approach.

Market Discipline in Banking

Market Discipline in Banking PDF

Author: George G. Kaufman

Publisher: Elsevier

Published: 2003-12-16

Total Pages: 464

ISBN-13: 9780762310807

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Contains papers which consider the basic role of market discipline, how it may be applied to banking and more broadly to large financial institutions of various types.

Market Discipline

Market Discipline PDF

Author: Mr.Timothy D. Lane

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 1992-06-01

Total Pages: 50

ISBN-13: 1451846150

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Under what circumstances can market forces prevent unsustainable borrowing? Effective market discipline requires that capital markets be open, that; information on the borrower’s existing liabilities be readily available, that no bailout be anticipated, and that the borrower respond to market signals. This paper explores the implications of these conditions, and reviews some relevant empirical evidence.

Market Discipline and Conflicts of Interest Between Banks and Pension Funds

Market Discipline and Conflicts of Interest Between Banks and Pension Funds PDF

Author: Mr.Adolfo Barajas

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2011-12-01

Total Pages: 44

ISBN-13: 1463926634

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We study the behavior of private pension funds as large depositors in a banking system. Using panel data analysis, we examine whether, and if so how, pension funds influence market discipline in Argentina in the period 1998-2001. We find evidence that pension funds exert market discipline and this discipline gets stronger as the share of pension fund deposits in a bank rises. However, conflicts of interest undermine the disciplining role of pension funds. Specifically, pension funds allocate deposits to banks with weak fundamentals that own pension fund management companies. We conclude that forbidding banks' ownership of companies involved in pension fund management can enhance market discipline.

Market Discipline Under Systemic Risk

Market Discipline Under Systemic Risk PDF

Author: Eduardo Levy Levy-Yeyati

Publisher:

Published: 2016

Total Pages: 49

ISBN-13:

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Levy-Yeyati, Martinez Peria, and Schmukler show that systemic risk exerts a significant impact on the behavior of depositors, sometimes overshadowing their responses to standard bank fundamentals. Systemic risk can affect market discipline both regardless of and through bank fundamentals. First, worsening systemic conditions can directly threaten the value of deposits by way of dual agency problems. Second, to the extent that banks are exposed to systemic risk, systemic shocks lead to a future deterioration of fundamentals not captured by their current values. Using data from the recent banking crises in Argentina and Uruguay, the authors show that market discipline is indeed quite robust once systemic risk is factored in. As systemic risk increases, the informational content of past fundamentals declines. These episodes also show how few systemic shocks can trigger a run irrespective of ex-ante fundamentals. Overall, the evidence suggests that in emerging economies, the notion of market discipline needs to account for systemic risk.This paper - a product of the Finance Team, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study market discipline.