Lanterna Rally

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Published: 2005

Total Pages: 128

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Dr. Richard Gatling invented the world's first practical machine gun in 1862. Between that weapon and subsequent improved designs, the world's armies had roughly 50 years to adopt the machine gun and perfect its employment before it helped wreak the carnage of World War I. However, for some reason or combination of reasons, none of the armies of the day saw fit to do so. This thesis explores the potential explanations behind this phenomenon by using the Russo-Japanese War as a case study. The Russo-Japanese War should have demonstrated to the world how the machine gun fundamentally altered the conduct of land warfare, especially since the major world powers all sent military observers to report on the war's events. The author shows that because of a complex combination of the prevalent military tactical culture, bureaucratic pragmatism, and logistical concerns, the five major protagonist armies of World War I failed to apply the lessons they learned about machine gun employment from the Russo-Japanese War and, as a result, were completely surprised by the weapon's impact on the battlefield 10 years later. Chapters 2-6 focus on each of the five major participant armies of the Great War: Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States. They concentrate on how these armies used machine guns prior to the Russo-Japanese war; what their observers reported about the machine gun and its employment; and what effect those reports had on changing their doctrine, tactics, procedures, acquisition strategies, and organizations. The final chapter offers a summation of why these five armies were less than fully effective at adapting their practices. The paper also contains two appendices: Appendix A contains a basic timeline and area map of the Russo-Japanese War, and appendix B is a weapons compendium of the machine guns in common use at the time and referred to throughout the thesis.