Legislative Oversight of Intelligence Activities
Author:
Publisher:
Published: 1994
Total Pages: 176
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche.
Author:
Publisher:
Published: 1994
Total Pages: 176
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Subcommittee on Legislation
Publisher:
Published: 1988
Total Pages: 364
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Author: Seumas Miller
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2021-11-07
Total Pages: 297
ISBN-13: 100050445X
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →This volume examines the ethical issues that arise as a result of national security intelligence collection and analysis. Powerful new technologies enable the collection, communication and analysis of national security data on an unprecedented scale. Data collection now plays a central role in intelligence practice, yet this development raises a host of ethical and national security problems, such as privacy; autonomy; threats to national security and democracy by foreign states; and accountability for liberal democracies. This volume provides a comprehensive set of in-depth ethical analyses of these problems by combining contributions from both ethics scholars and intelligence practitioners. It provides the reader with a practical understanding of relevant operations, the issues that they raise and analysis of how responses to these issues can be informed by a commitment to liberal democratic values. This combination of perspectives is crucial in providing an informed appreciation of ethical challenges that is also grounded in the realities of the practice of intelligence. This book will be of great interest to all students of intelligence studies, ethics, security studies, foreign policy and international relations. The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Publisher:
Published: 1984
Total Pages: 200
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Author: Frederick M. Kaiser
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
Published: 2011-05
Total Pages: 30
ISBN-13: 143793286X
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Contents: (1) Intro.; (2) House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence; (3) Joint Committee on Atomic Energy as a Model; (4) Proposed Joint Committee on Intelligence Characteristics: Methods of Establishment; Jurisdiction and Authority; Membership; Terms and Rotation; Leadership; Secrecy Controls; Pros and Cons; (5) Alternatives to a Joint Committee: Changing the Select Committees¿ Structure and Powers; Concerns about Restructuring the Intelligence Committees; Constraints on Coordination; Increasing the Use of Congressional Support Agencies; (6) Observations on Oversight of Intelligence: Obstacles to Oversight: Secrecy Constraints. This is a print on demand edition of an important, hard-to-find publication.
Author: Zachary K. Goldman
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2016-04-26
Total Pages: 393
ISBN-13: 0190458089
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →In a world that is increasingly unstable, intelligence services like the American CIA and the United Kingdom's MI6 exist to deliver security. Whether the challenge involves terrorism, cyber-security, or the renewed specter of great power conflict, intelligence agencies mitigate threats and provide decisional advantage to national leaders. But empowered intelligence services require adequate supervision and oversight, which must be about more than the narrow (if still precarious) task of ensuring the legality of covert operations and surveillance activities. Global Intelligence Oversight is a comparative investigation of how democratic countries can govern their intelligence services so that they are effective, but operate within frameworks that are acceptable to their people in an interconnected world. The book demonstrates how the institutions that oversee intelligence agencies participate in the protection of national security while safeguarding civil liberties, balancing among competing national interests, and building public trust in inherently secret activities. It does so by analyzing the role of courts and independent oversight bodies as they operate in countries with robust constitutional frameworks and powerful intelligence services. The book also illuminates a new transnational oversight dynamic that is shaping and constraining security services in new ways. It describes how global technology companies and litigation in transnational forums constitute a new form of oversight whose contours are still undefined. As rapid changes in technology bring the world closer together, these forces will complement their more traditional counterparts in ensuring that intelligence activities remain effective, legitimate, and sustainable.
Author: United States. Congress
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
Published: 2018-01-17
Total Pages: 64
ISBN-13: 9781983884429
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Congressional oversight of intelligence activities : hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, November 13, 2007.
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations
Publisher:
Published: 1976
Total Pages: 562
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Author: Congressional Research Service
Publisher: Independently Published
Published: 2019-01-02
Total Pages: 24
ISBN-13: 9781793036230
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Prior to the establishment of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) in 1976 and 1977, respectively, Congress did not take much interest in conducting oversight of the intelligence community (IC). The Subcommittees on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the congressional Armed Services Committees had nominal oversight responsibility, though Congress generally trusted that IC could more or less regulate itself and conduct activities that complied with the law, were ethical, and shared a common understanding of national security priorities. Media reports in the 1970s of the CIA﷿s domestic surveillance of Americans opposed to the war in Vietnam, in addition to the agency﷿s activities relating to national elections in Chile, prompted Congress to change its approach. In 1975, Congress established two select committees to investigate intelligence activities, chaired by Senator Frank Church in the Senate (the ﷿Church Committee﷿), and Representative Otis Pike in the House (the ﷿Pike Committee﷿). Following their creation, the Church and Pike committees﷿ hearings revealed the possible extent of the abuse of authority by the IC and the potential need for permanent committee oversight focused solely on the IC and intelligence activities. SSCI and HPSCI oversight contributed substantially to Congress' work to legislate improvements to intelligence organization, programs, and processes, and it enabled a more structured, routine relationship with intelligence agencies. On occasion, this has resulted in Congress advocating on behalf of intelligence reform legislation that many agree has generally improved IC organization and performance. At other times, congressional oversight has been perceived as less helpful, delving into the details of programs and activities. Other congressional committees have cooperated with the HPSCI and SSCI in their oversight role since their establishment. Intelligence programs are often closely tied to foreign and defense policy, military operations, homeland security, cybersecurity, and law enforcement. Committees in both chambers for Foreign Affairs/Relations, Armed Services, Appropriations, Judiciary, and Homeland Security, therefore, share jurisdiction over intelligence. Some have suggested the current overlapping jurisdictions for oversight of the IC in Congress contribute to the perception of weak congressional intelligence committees that have relatively little authority and insufficient expertise. Others cite the overlapping responsibilities as a strength. Oversight of the IC spread over more committees can contribute to greater awareness and transparency in Congress of classified intelligence activities that are largely hidden from public view. They also claim that since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Senate and House rules have changed to enable the congressional intelligence committees to have more authority and be more effective in carrying out their oversight responsibilities. Further reform, they argue, may be unrealistic from a political standpoint. An oft-cited observation of the Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (i.e., the 9-11 Commission) that congressional oversight of intelligence is ﷿dysfunctional﷿ continues to overshadow discussion of whether Congress has done enough. Does congressional oversight enable the IC to be more effective, better funded, and better organized, or does it burden agencies by the sheer volume of detailed inquiries into intelligence programs and related activities? A central question for Congress is as follows: Could additional changes to the rules governing congressional oversight of intelligence enable Congress to more effectively fund programs, influence policy, and legislate improvements in intelligence standards, organization, and process that would make the country safer?
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations
Publisher:
Published: 1975
Total Pages: 224
ISBN-13:
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