Law and Objectivity

Law and Objectivity PDF

Author: Kent Greenawalt

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 1995-06-29

Total Pages: 301

ISBN-13: 0195356926

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

In modern times the idea of the objectivity of law has been undermined by skepticism about legal institutions, disbelief in ideals of unbiased evaluation, and a conviction that language is indeterminate. Greenawalt here considers the validity of such skepticism, examining such questions as: whether the law as it exists provides determinate answers to legal problems; whether the law should treat people in an "objective way," according to abstract rules, general categories, and external consequences; and how far the law is anchored in something external to itself, such as social morality, political justice, or economic efficiency. In the process he illuminates the development of jurisprudence in the English-speaking world over the last fifty years, assessing the contributions of many important movements.

Judicial Review in an Objective Legal System

Judicial Review in an Objective Legal System PDF

Author: Tara Smith

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2015-07-30

Total Pages: 303

ISBN-13: 1107114497

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

This book grounds judicial review in its deepest foundations: the function, authority, and objectivity of a legal system as a whole.

Objectivity in Law

Objectivity in Law PDF

Author: Nicos Stavropoulos

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 1996

Total Pages: 238

ISBN-13: 9780198258995

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

This treatise addresses a central topic in contemporary jurisprudence, namely whether it is possible for legal interpretations to be objective. The author claims that objectivity is possible in law, offering arguments based on metaphysics, philosophy and meta-ethics to reinforce his theory.

Objectivity in Law and Morals

Objectivity in Law and Morals PDF

Author: Brian Leiter

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2001

Total Pages: 368

ISBN-13: 0521554306

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

The seven original essays included in this volume from 2000, written by some of the world's most distinguished moral and legal philosophers, offer a sophisticated perspective on issues about the objectivity of legal interpretation and judicial decision-making. They examine objectivity from both metaphysical and epistemological perspectives and develop a variety of approaches, constructive and critical, to the fundamental problems of objectivity in morality. One of the key issues explored is that of the alleged 'domain-specificity' of conceptions of objectivity, i.e. whether there is a conception of objectivity appropriate for ethics that is different in kind from the conception of objectivity appropriate for other areas of study. This volume considers the intersection between objectivity in ethics and objectivity in law. It presents a survey of live issues in metaethics, and examines their relevance to theorizing about law and adjudication.

Objectivity and the Rule of Law

Objectivity and the Rule of Law PDF

Author: Matthew Kramer

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2007-06-11

Total Pages: 233

ISBN-13: 1139463969

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

What is objectivity? What is the rule of law? Are the operations of legal systems objective? If so, in what ways and to what degrees are they objective? Does anything of importance depend on the objectivity of law? These are some of the principal questions addressed by Matthew H. Kramer in this lucid and wide-ranging study that introduces readers to vital areas of philosophical enquiry. As Kramer shows, objectivity and the rule of law are complicated phenomena, each comprising a number of distinct though overlapping dimensions. Although the connections between objectivity and the rule of law are intimate, they are also densely multi-faceted.

Common Law Judging

Common Law Judging PDF

Author: Douglas E. Edlin

Publisher: University of Michigan Press

Published: 2020-03-06

Total Pages: 281

ISBN-13: 0472902342

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

Are judges supposed to be objective? Citizens, scholars, and legal professionals commonly assume that subjectivity and objectivity are opposites, with the corollary that subjectivity is a vice and objectivity is a virtue. These assumptions underlie passionate debates over adherence to original intent and judicial activism. In Common Law Judging, Douglas Edlin challenges these widely held assumptions by reorienting the entire discussion. Rather than analyze judging in terms of objectivity and truth, he argues that we should instead approach the role of a judge’s individual perspective in terms of intersubjectivity and validity. Drawing upon Kantian aesthetic theory as well as case law, legal theory, and constitutional theory, Edlin develops a new conceptual framework for the respective roles of the individual judge and of the judiciary as an institution, as well as the relationship between them, as integral parts of the broader legal and political community. Specifically, Edlin situates a judge’s subjective responses within a form of legal reasoning and reflective judgment that must be communicated to different audiences. Edlin concludes that the individual values and perspectives of judges are indispensable both to their judgments in specific cases and to the independence of the courts. According to the common law tradition, judicial subjectivity is a virtue, not a vice.

How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law

How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law PDF

Author: Kenneth R. Westphal

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2016-04-07

Total Pages: 208

ISBN-13: 0191064122

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

Kenneth R. Westphal presents an original interpretation of Hume's and Kant's moral philosophies, the differences between which are prominent in current philosophical accounts. Westphal argues that focussing on these differences, however, occludes a decisive, shared achievement: a distinctive constructivist method to identify basic moral principles and to justify their strict objectivity, without invoking moral realism nor moral anti-realism or irrealism. Their constructivism is based on Hume's key insight that 'though the laws of justice are artificial, they are not arbitrary'. Arbitrariness in basic moral principles is avoided by starting with fundamental problems of social coördination which concern outward behaviour and physiological needs; basic principles of justice are artificial because solving those problems does not require appeal to moral realism (nor to moral anti-realism). Instead, moral cognitivism is preserved by identifying sufficient justifying reasons, which can be addressed to all parties, for the minimum sufficient legitimate principles and institutions required to provide and protect basic forms of social coördination (including verbal behaviour). Hume first develops this kind of constructivism for basic property rights and for government. Kant greatly refines Hume's construction of justice within his 'metaphysical principles of justice', whilst preserving the core model of Hume's innovative constructivism. Hume's and Kant's constructivism avoids the conventionalist and relativist tendencies latent if not explicit in contemporary forms of moral constructivism.

A New, Objective, Pro-Objectivity Normative Theory

A New, Objective, Pro-Objectivity Normative Theory PDF

Author: Frederick Farrand

Publisher: University Press of America

Published: 2011

Total Pages: 222

ISBN-13: 0761852867

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

Mostly theory. Arguing for an objective theory -- More preliminary discussion of practical applications -- Structural form -- Mostly practical applications. Further issues and applications -- Other further issues and applications.

Objectivity: A Very Short Introduction

Objectivity: A Very Short Introduction PDF

Author: Stephen Gaukroger

Publisher: OUP Oxford

Published: 2012-05-24

Total Pages: 129

ISBN-13: 0191642096

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

- Is objectivity possible? - Can there be objectivity in matters of morals, or tastes? - What would a truly objective account of the world be like? - Is everything subjective, or relative? - Are moral judgments objective or culturally relative? Objectivity is both an essential and elusive philosophical concept. An account is generally considered to be objective if it attempts to capture the nature of the object studied without judgement of a conscious entity or subject. Objectivity stands in contrast to subjectivity: an objective account is impartial, one which could ideally be accepted by any subject, because it does not draw on any assumptions, prejudices, or values of particular subjects. Stephen Gaukroger shows that it is far from clear that we can resolve moral or aesthetic disputes in this way and it has often been argued that such an approach is not always appropriate for disciplines that deal with human, rather than natural, phenomena. Moreover, even in those cases where we seek to be objective, it may be difficult to judge what a truly objective account would look like, and whether it is achievable. This Very Short Introduction demonstrates that there are a number of common misunderstandings about what objectivity is, and explores the theoretical and practical problems of objectivity by assessing the basic questions raised by it. As well as considering the core philosophical issues, Gaukroger also deals with the way in which particular understandings of objectivity impinge on social research, science, and art. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.

Positive Law and Objective Values

Positive Law and Objective Values PDF

Author: Andrei Marmor

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2001

Total Pages: 212

ISBN-13: 9780198268970

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

This book presents a comprehensive defence of legal positivism on the basis of a novel account of social conventions. Marmor argues that the law is founded on constitutive conventions, and that consequently moral values cannot determine what the law is. On the basis of a theory of socialconventions and an analysis of law's authoritative nature, the book sets out the scope of law in relation to moral and other critical values. The book also maintains, however, that moral values are objective. It comprises a detailed analysis of the concept of objectivity, arguing that many aspectsof the law, and of moral values, are metaphysically objective.