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Author: Virginia A. Hettinger
Publisher: University of Virginia Press
Published: 2006
Total Pages: 172
ISBN-13: 9780813926971
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Focusing on the behavioral aspects of disagreement within a panel and between the levels of the federal judicial hierarchy, the authors reveal the impact of individual attitudes or preferences on judicial decision-making, and hence on political divisions in the broader society.
Author: Gabrielle Appleby
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2021-04-29
Total Pages: 341
ISBN-13: 1108852041
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →The Judge, the Judiciary and the Court is aimed at anyone interested in the Australian judiciary today. It examines the impact of the individual on the judicial role, while exploring the collegiate environment in which judges must operate. This professional community can provide support but may also present its own challenges within the context of a particular court's relational dynamic and culture. The judge and the judiciary form the 'court', an institution grounded in a set of constitutional values that will influence how judges and the judiciary perform their functions. This collection brings together analysis of the judicial role that highlights these unique aspects, particularly in the Australian setting. Through the lenses of judicial leadership, diversity, collegiality, dissent, style, technology, the media and popular culture, it analyses how judges work individually and as a collective to protect and promote the institutional values of the court.
Author: Jud Mathews
Publisher:
Published: 2013
Total Pages: 0
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →It is common to think that replacing a judge with a new appointment nearer an ideological extreme will pull outcomes on the court in the ideological direction of the new appointment. This paper argues that this intuition is not always correct, at least for a class of close cases. The model developed here predicts that, in certain close cases, appointing a conservative (liberal) to replace a moderate may result in a loss for the court's conservative (liberal) wing. What drives this outcome is expressive costs: judges incur a cost for signing opinions distant from their own ideal points, so that a judge nearer the swing vote can better afford the compromises required to win. The model holds implications for judicial appointment strategies and helps explain findings that have puzzled other scholars.
Author: Morgan L. W. Hazelton
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2023
Total Pages: 305
ISBN-13: 0197625401
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →"The Elevator Effect: Contact and Collegiality in the American Judiciary presents a comprehensive, first of its kind examination of the importance of interpersonal relationships among judges for judicial decisionmaking and legal development. Regarding decisionmaking, the authors demonstrate that more frequent interpersonal contact among judges diminishes the role of ideology in judicial decisionmaking to the point where it is both substantively and statistically imperceptible. This finding stands in stark contrast to judicial decisionmaking accounts that present ideology as an unwavering determinant of judicial choice. With regard to legal development, the book shows that collegiality affects both the language that judges use to express their disagreement with one another and the precedents they choose to support their arguments. Thus, the overriding argument of The Elevator Effect is that collegiality affects nearly every aspect of judicial behavior. The authors draw on an impressive and unique original collection of data since the American founding to untangle the relationship between judges' interpersonal relationships and the law they produce. The Elevator Effect presents a clear and highly readable narrative backed by analysis of judicial behavior throughout the U.S. federal judicial hierarchy to demonstrate that the institutional structure in which judges operate substantially tempers judicial behavior"--
Author: Birke Häcker
Publisher:
Published: 2020
Total Pages: 0
ISBN-13: 9781780686240
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →This book focuses on the decision-making processes in modern collegiate courts. Judges from some of the world s highest and most significant judicial bodies, both national and supranational, share their experiences and reflect on the challenges to which their joint judicial endeavour gives rise.
Author: David M. O'Brien
Publisher: CQ Press
Published: 2016-05-20
Total Pages: 625
ISBN-13: 150634030X
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Thoroughly revised and updated for this Fifth Edition, Judges on Judging offers insights into the judicial philosophies and political views of those on the bench. Broad in scope, this one-of-a-kind book features “off-the-bench” writings and speeches in which Supreme Court justices, as well as lower federal and state court judges, discuss the judicial process, constitutional interpretation, judicial federalism, and the role of the judiciary. Engaging introductory material written by David M. O’Brien provides students with necessary thematic and historical context making this book the perfect supplement to present a nuanced view of the judiciary.
Author: Richard A. Posner
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Published: 2013-10-07
Total Pages: 393
ISBN-13: 0674184645
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →For Richard Posner, legal formalism and formalist judges--notably Antonin Scalia--present the main obstacles to coping with the dizzying pace of technological advance. Posner calls for legal realism--gathering facts, considering context, and reaching a sensible conclusion that inflicts little collateral damage on other areas of the law.
Author: Forrest Maltzman
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2000-07-03
Total Pages: 226
ISBN-13: 9780521783941
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Supreme Court decisions stem largely from the political nature of the opinion writing process.
Author: Cass R. Sunstein
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
Published: 2007-02-01
Total Pages: 194
ISBN-13: 0815782357
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Over the past two decades, the United States has seen an intense debate about the composition of the federal judiciary. Are judges "activists"? Should they stop "legislating from the bench"? Are they abusing their authority? Or are they protecting fundamental rights, in a way that is indispensable in a free society? Are Judges Political? cuts through the noise by looking at what judges actually do. Drawing on a unique data set consisting of thousands of judicial votes, Cass Sunstein and his colleagues analyze the influence of ideology on judicial voting, principally in the courts of appeal. They focus on two questions: Do judges appointed by Republican Presidents vote differently from Democratic appointees in ideologically contested cases? And do judges vote differently depending on the ideological leanings of the other judges hearing the same case? After examining votes on a broad range of issues--including abortion, affirmative action, and capital punishment--the authors do more than just confirm that Democratic and Republican appointees often vote in different ways. They inject precision into an all-too-often impressionistic debate by quantifying this effect and analyzing the conditions under which it holds. This approach sometimes generates surprising results: under certain conditions, for example, Democrat-appointed judges turn out to have more conservative voting patterns than Republican appointees. As a general rule, ideology should not and does not affect legal judgments. Frequently, the law is clear and judges simply implement it, whatever their political commitments. But what happens when the law is unclear? Are Judges Political? addresses this vital question.
Author: Jonathan P. Kastellec
Publisher:
Published: 2013
Total Pages: 0
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Do hierarchical politics in the federal judiciary shape collegial politics on the U.S. Courts of Appeals and thus influence judicial voting and case outcomes? I develop a model in which the political control of the dual layer of hierarchy above three-judge panels - full circuits and the Supreme Court - affects the ability of a single Democratic or Republican judge on a three-judge panel to influence two colleagues from the opposing party. The theory predicts that panel majorities should be more strongly influenced by a single judge of the opposing party - a "counter-judge" - when that judge is aligned with the Supreme Court. Examining thousands of judicial votes in multiple issue areas, I show that the effect of adding a counter-judge to a panel is indeed asymmetric, and varies based on hierarchical alignment. The interaction of hierarchical and collegial politics increases the Supreme Court's control of the judicial hierarchy and helps promotes the rule of law.
