Joint Operations in the Gulf War

Joint Operations in the Gulf War PDF

Author: P. Mason Carpenter,, PMason Carpenter , USAF

Publisher:

Published: 1996-02-29

Total Pages: 96

ISBN-13: 9781469954646

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To what extent was the effectiveness of joint operations in the Gulf War influencedby individual service perspectives? This study uses Graham Allison's three models ofbureaucratic behavior (Model I, Rational Actor; Model II, Organizational Process;and Model III, Bureaucratic Politics) to answer this question. The value ofinterservice integration has been recognized for a long time. The Department ofDefense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols) made significant stridesintegrating the services at the most senior levels, that is, the component commandersand above. The study concludes that, in general, at the component commander leveland above during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, rational decisions weremade and rational actions were implemented to prosecute the war (Model Ibehavior). The Goldwater-Nichols legislation did not make as much headway,however, in integrating the services below the level of component commander.Unlike the most senior levels of command, decisions made and actions taken were not always implemented for the most rational reason. For the most part, decisionsand actions were Model I. But at times, decisions and actions were not optimalbecause the decisionmaker/actor lacked information, had a different serviceperspective, and/or inadequately understood and empathized with members of theother services (primarily Model II, but with traces of Model III as well). Based onthese findings, the study suggests in order to continue to improve interserviceintegration, we need to teach concepts of service integration early in an officer'scareer, expand joint interaction and provide some additional standardization amongtheaters.

Joint Operations in the Gulf War. An Allison Analysis

Joint Operations in the Gulf War. An Allison Analysis PDF

Author: P. M. Carpenter

Publisher:

Published: 1995

Total Pages: 93

ISBN-13:

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To what extent was the effectiveness of joint operations in the Gulf War influenced by individual service perspectives? This study uses Graham Allison's three models of bureaucratic behavior (Model I, Rational Actor; Model II, Organizational Process; and Model III, Bureaucratic Politics) to answer this question. The value of interservice integration has been recognized for a long time. The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater Nichols Act) made significant strides in integrating the services at the most senior levels. That is, it effected the component commanders and above. The study concludes that, in general, at the component commander level and above during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, rational decisions were made and rational actions were implemented to prosecute the war (Model I behavior). The Goldwater-Nichols legislation did not make as much headway, however, in integrating the services below the level of component commander. Unlike the most senior levels of command, decisions made and actions taken were not always implemented for the most rational reason. For the most part, decisions and actions were Model I. But at times, decisions and actions were not optimal because the decisionmaker/actor lacked information, had a different service perspective, and/or inadequately understood and empathized with members of the other services (primarily Model II, but with traces of Model III as well). Based on these findings, the study suggests that in order to continue to improve interservice integration, we need to teach concepts of service integration early in an officer's career, expand joint interaction and provide some additional standardization among theaters.

The State of the US Army and Space Operations

The State of the US Army and Space Operations PDF

Author: Avery V. Allison

Publisher:

Published: 1998

Total Pages: 42

ISBN-13:

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At the end of Operations Desert Shield/Storm, many in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and elsewhere declared the U.S. had won "the first Space War". This study will demonstrate the Gulf War represents an important benchmark for the role of U.S. space systems in support of warfighters. This study will show that while the Gulf War demonstrated the promise of fully integrating space systems into the U.S. joint doctrine and operations, lessons learned in the Gulf War identified shortfalls in planning, doctrine, experience and operations which remain to be addressed. This study explores the importance of space support to U.S. ground warfighters. U.S. military planners have made efforts to develop space policy and doctrine reflecting the end of the Cold War and emerging space systems technology. The study includes a brief synopsis of the emerging doctrine. Since the Gulf War U.S. space force structure modifications and technological developments have progressed. This study will evaluate if these changes successfully overcome Gulf War deficiencies. This study will assess the changing space environment in order to determine if the U.S. is better prepared to employ space plans, doctrine, force structure, experience and systems to support U.S. ground command in likely future conflicts.

Joint Air Operations

Joint Air Operations PDF

Author: James A. Winnefeld

Publisher: US Naval Institute Press

Published: 1993

Total Pages: 264

ISBN-13:

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"With the current downsizing of the U.S. military putting a premium on joint response to threats, this landmark study of joint U.S. air operations over the past fifty years provides timely information on a topic of vital concern. The most comprehensive single-volume discussion available, it examines six major air campaigns - Midway, the Solomon Islands, Korea, Vietnam, El Dorado Canyon (Libya), and Desert Storm - in a search for lessons learned that might be applied in the planning and organizing of future joint operations." "The focus of the book is on the differences - at times bitter acrimony - among the services on the control and employment of theater air forces. With each service having an "air force" of its own, each with a distinctive doctrine, the study confirms that their views are often diametrically opposite and that joint doctrine has been slow to evolve." "The authors, RAND Corporation analysts, are refreshingly objective and clear in addressing the problems and issues that continue to hamper effective joint air operations but point to the progress shown in Desert Storm, as indicated by their interviews with some fifty airmen, planners, and major commanders of the operation. Their recommendations for the future take advantage of the diversity inherent in U.S. air power while minimizing sources of disharmony." "Based on a RAND study published in 1991, this book has been expanded and revised to appeal to a broader audience and promises to stimulate discussion and debate on how to optimize the effectiveness of U.S. forces facing cuts in funding. It is must reading not only for military professionals but for military history enthusiasts and everyone interested in the nature of America's future air battles."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved

US Military Innovation Since the Cold War

US Military Innovation Since the Cold War PDF

Author: Harvey Sapolsky

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2009-04-28

Total Pages: 219

ISBN-13: 1135968683

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explains how the US military transformation failed in the post-Cold war era Harvey Sapolsky is a leading defence scholar in the US will be of interest to students of strategic studies, defence studies, military studies, US politics and security studies in general

The Link

The Link PDF

Author: Louis Fairmont

Publisher: Lulu.com

Published: 2008-12-04

Total Pages: 349

ISBN-13: 0578002744

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This book provides new evidence that there was a direct operational link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaida. The Link is primarily sourced from the Pentagon Report on Saddam that was released March 2008. The Pentagon report includes some of the actual sourced Iraqi documents, memos, and transcripts retrieved by the U.S. Military during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Link provides new evidence regarding: * Saddam and al Qaida were working together since 1990 * al Qaida was located in Iraq since 1995 * Saddam in his own words says he gave the order for the 1993 World Trade Center attack. * An Iraqi agent met with a 9/11 hijacker prior to the 9/11 attack * WMDs were in Iraq up until Operation Iraqi Freedom Read the truth that has been suppressed until now! This release is a paperback sized 6" x 9" and is sized for distribution on Amazon.