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Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam

Author: Lloyd C. Gardner

Publisher: The New Press

Published: 2011-07-19

Total Pages: 479

ISBN-13: 1595587373

Essays by Christian G. Appy, Andrew J. Bacevich, John Prados, and others offer “history at its best, meaning, at its most useful.” —Howard Zinn From the launch of the “Shock and Awe” invasion in March 2003 through President George W. Bush’s declaration of “Mission Accomplished” two months later, the war in Iraq was meant to demonstrate definitively that the United States had learned the lessons of Vietnam. This new book makes clear that something closer to the opposite is true—that US foreign policy makers have learned little from the past, even as they have been obsessed with the “Vietnam Syndrome.” Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam brings together the country’s leading historians of the Vietnam experience. Examining the profound changes that have occurred in the country and the military since the Vietnam War, this book assembles a distinguished group to consider how America found itself once again in the midst of a quagmire—and the continuing debate about the purpose and exercise of American power. Also includes contributions from: Alex Danchev * David Elliott * Elizabeth L. Hillman * Gabriel Kolko * Walter LaFeber * Wilfried Mausbach * Alfred W. McCoy * Gareth Porter “Essential.” —Bill Moyers

Vietnam in Iraq

Author: David Ryan

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2007-01-24

Total Pages: 458

ISBN-13: 1134135270

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More than most post-1970 conflicts involving US forces, the conflict in Iraq has been fought out against a background of frequently invoked memories from the era of the Vietnam War. The essays in this book offer a series of perspectives on connections and parallels between the Vietnam War and the 2003 invasion of, and conflict in, Iraq. The contributors particularly examine the impact of the Vietnam analogy on the War in Iraq, assessing the military tactical lessons learned from the Vietnam War and exploring the influence and persistence of its legacy in US politics, culture and diplomacy. The volume holds up to original interrogation some commonly held assumptions about historical analogy, and several distinguished authorities on the Vietnam War era, in particular, offer their thoughts on the value and applicability of Vietnam-Iraq parallels. If most contributions point out some obvious dissimilarities between the two eras, notably the transformed post-Cold War international environment, the similarities, particularly those relating to the problems of cultural misunderstanding, are also apparent. Vietnam in Iraq will be of great interest for all students and researchers of the Iraq War, strategic studies, international relations and American politics.

Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam

Author: John Nagl

Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA

Published: 2002-10-30

Total Pages: 273

ISBN-13: 0313077037

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Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.

Not Even Past

Author: David Fitzgerald

Publisher: Berghahn Books

Published: 2020-03-20

Total Pages: 286

ISBN-13: 1789202167

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Offers essential perspectives on the Cold War and post-9/11 eras and explores the troubling implications of the American tendency to fight wars without end. “Featuring lucid and penetrating essays by a stellar roster of scholars, the volume provides deep insights into one of the grand puzzles of the age: why the U.S. has so often failed to exit wars on its terms.”— Fredrik Logevall, Laurence D. Belfer Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan: Taken together, these conflicts are the key to understanding more than a half century of American military history. In addition, they have shaped, in profound ways, the culture and politics of the United States—as well as the nations in which they have been fought. This volume brings together international experts on American history and foreign affairs to assess the cumulative impact of the United States’ often halting and conflicted attempts to end wars. From the introduction: The refusal to engage in historical thinking, that form of reflection deeply immersed in the US experience of war and intervention, means that this cultural amnesia is related to a strategic incoherence and, in these wars, the United States has failed in its strategic objectives because it did not define, precisely, what they were. If Vietnam was the tragedy, Iraq and Afghanistan were repeated failures. The objectives and the national interests were elusive beyond issues of credibility, identity, and revenge; the end point was undefined because it was not clear what the point was. What did the United States want from these wars? What did it want to leave behind?

Why We Lost

Author: Daniel P. Bolger

Publisher: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt

Published: 2014

Total Pages: 565

ISBN-13: 0544370481

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A high-ranking general's gripping insider account of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how it all went wrong. Over a thirty-five-year career, Daniel Bolger rose through the army infantry to become a three-star general, commanding in both theaters of the U.S. campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. He participated in meetings with top-level military and civilian players, where strategy was made and managed. At the same time, he regularly carried a rifle alongside rank-and-file soldiers in combat actions, unusual for a general. Now, as a witness to all levels of military command, Bolger offers a unique assessment of these wars, from 9/11 to the final withdrawal from the region. Writing with hard-won experience and unflinching honesty, Bolger makes the firm case that in Iraq and in Afghanistan, we lost -- but we didn't have to. Intelligence was garbled. Key decision makers were blinded by spreadsheets or theories. And, at the root of our failure, we never really understood our enemy. Why We Lost is a timely, forceful, and compulsively readable account of these wars from a fresh and authoritative perspective.

The Sheriff of Ramadi

Author: Dick R Couch

Publisher: Naval Institute Press

Published: 2008-10-01

Total Pages: 268

ISBN-13: 1612514189

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The Sheriff of Ramadi is the first book written about the courage and success of the Navy SEALs in Ramadi. The Battle of Ramadi was the most sustained and vicious engagement fought by Navy SEALs since their inception in 1962. Never has a conventional commander fought a battle using Special Operations Forces as an intricate part of his battle plan. The operational and intelligence-gathering capabilities of a SEAL Task Unit produced startling and unprecedented success on the battlefield and in this urban battlespace. The book is an account of the Navy SEAL Task Unit in Ramadi from October 2005 through October 2007. The text follows the Battle of Ramadi (often called the Second Battle of Ramadi) and the deployment of the SEAL Task Unit in that battle. The book is based on extensive interviews with Army, Navy, and Marine command and operational personnel who fought in this battle, and the author personally spent time in Ramadi in 2007 for a first hand assessment of the situation. Couch considers the Battle of Ramadi to be the most significant military engagement in the Global War Against Terrorism since 9/11. The Battle of Ramadi and the Battle for al-Anbar Province was the first battle where SOF/Navy SEALs and conventional forces fought side by side to achieve victory. The Battle of Ramadi and the lessons learned provides a template for future joint combined Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces cooperation in the new battles pace in the war against al-Qaeda and their allies. The lethal component SEALs can bring to an active, insurgent battle space. The Battle of Ramadi was fought with 5,500 soldiers and marines, 2,300 soldiers from the new Iraqi army, and 32 operational SEALS. Of the 1,100+ insurgents killed in the Battle, Navy SEALs accounted for a third of them.

Harsh Lessons

Author: Ben Barry

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2018-10-10

Total Pages: 164

ISBN-13: 0429628366

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The recent Afghanistan and Iraq wars were very controversial. The conflicts’ casualties, intractability and the apparent failure of the US and its allies to achieve their objectives mean that many see the wars as failures. This resulted in a loss of confidence in the West of the utility of force as an instrument of state power. Both wars have been well described by journalists. There is no shortage of memoirs. But there is little discussion of how the conduct of these wars and capabilities of the forces involved changed and evolved, and of the implications of these developments for future warfare. This book gives readers a clear understanding of the military character dynamics of both wars and how these changed between 2001 and 2014. This includes the strategy, operations, tactics and technology of the forces of the US and its allies, Afghan and Iraqi government forces as well as insurgents and militias, showing how they evolved over time. Many of these developments have wider relevance to future conflicts. The book identifies those that are of potential wider application to US, NATO and other western forces, to insurgents, as well as to forces of states that might choose to confront the west militarily.

Why Vietnam Matters

Author: Rufus Phillips

Publisher: US Naval Institute Press

Published: 2017-08-15

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13: 9781682473108

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Phillips's short chapter on lessons the U.S. should have learned from the Vietnam War should be mandatory reading in Washington, D.C. -- Publishers Weekly It is, among other things, a wonderful read, full of detail and drama. --George Packer, The New Yorker Rufus Phillips offers an extraordinary inside history of the most critical years of American involvement in Vietnam, from 1954 to 1968, and explains why it still matters. Describing what went right and then wrong, he ﬁnds that our failure to understand the Communists, our South Vietnamese allies, or even ourselves took us down the wrong road of a conventional war until it was too late--we missed the war's essential political character. Documenting the story from his own personal ﬁles, now available at the Texas Tech Vietnam Archive, as well as from the historical record, the former government ofﬁcial paints striking portraits of such key ﬁgures as John F. Kennedy, Maxwell Taylor, Robert McNamara, Henry Cabot Lodge, Hubert Humphrey, and Ngo Dinh Diem, among others with whom he dealt.

A Better War

Author: Lewis Sorley

Publisher: HMH

Published: 1999-06-03

Total Pages: 547

ISBN-13: 0547417454

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“A comprehensive and long-overdue examination of the immediate post–Tet offensive years [from a] first-rate historian.” —The New York Times Book Review Neglected by scholars and journalists alike, the years of conflict in Vietnam from 1968 to 1975 offer surprises not only about how the war was fought, but about what was achieved. Drawing from thousands of hours of previously unavailable (and still classified) tape-recorded meetings between the highest levels of the American military command in Vietnam, A Better War is an insightful, factual, and superbly documented history of these final years. Through his exclusive access to authoritative materials, award-winning historian Lewis Sorley highlights the dramatic differences in conception, conduct, and—at least for a time—results between the early and later years of the war. Among his most important findings is that while the war was being lost at the peace table and in the U.S. Congress, the soldiers were winning on the ground. Meticulously researched and movingly told, A Better War sheds new light on the Vietnam War.

Learning to Forget

Author: David Fitzgerald

Publisher: Stanford University Press

Published: 2013-06-26

Total Pages: 298

ISBN-13: 0804786429

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Learning to Forget analyzes the evolution of US counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine over the last five decades. Beginning with an extensive section on the lessons of Vietnam, it traces the decline of COIN in the 1970s, then the rebirth of low intensity conflict through the Reagan years, in the conflict in Bosnia, and finally in the campaigns of Iraq and Afghanistan. Ultimately it closes the loop by explaining how, by confronting the lessons of Vietnam, the US Army found a way out of those most recent wars. In the process it provides an illustration of how military leaders make use of history and demonstrates the difficulties of drawing lessons from the past that can usefully be applied to contemporary circumstances. The book outlines how the construction of lessons is tied to the construction of historical memory and demonstrates how histories are constructed to serve the needs of the present. In so doing, it creates a new theory of doctrinal development.