-PDF Download- Hub And Spoke Cartels EBOOK

Hub-and-Spoke Cartels

Author: Luke Garrod

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 2021-11-16

Total Pages: 303

ISBN-13: 0262046202

The first comprehensive economic and legal analysis of hub-and-spoke cartels, with detailed case studies. A cartel forms when competitors conspire to limit competition through coordinated actions. Most cartels are composed exclusively of firms that would otherwise be in competition, but in a hub-and-spoke cartel, those competitors (“spokes”) conspire with the assistance of an upstream supplier or a downstream buyer (“hub”). This book provides the first comprehensive economic and legal analysis of hub-and-spoke cartels, explaining their formation and how they operate to create and sustain a collusive environment. Sixteen detailed case studies, including cases brought against toy manufacturer Hasbro and the Apple ebook case, illustrate the economic framework and legal strategies discussed. The authors identify three types of hub-and-spoke cartels: when an upstream firm facilitates downstream firms to coordinate on higher prices; when a downstream intermediary facilitates upstream suppliers to coordinate on higher prices; and when a downstream firm facilitates upstream suppliers to exclude a downstream rival. They devote a chapter to each type, discussing the formation, coordination, enforcement, efficacy, and prosecution of these cartels, and consider general lessons that can be drawn from the case studies. Finally, they present strategies for prosecuting hub-and-spoke collusion. The book is written to be accessible to both economists and lawyers, and is intended for both scholars and practitioners.

Hub-and-Spoke Cartels

Author: Luke Garrod

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 2021-11-16

Total Pages: 303

ISBN-13: 026236722X

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

Hub-and-spoke Cartels

Author: Luke Garrod

Publisher:

Published: 2021

Total Pages:

ISBN-13: 9780262367219

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

"A comprehensive economic and legal analysis of a unique form of collusive behavior"--

Handbook on European Competition Law

Author: Ioannis Lianos

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

Published: 2013-10-31

Total Pages: 688

ISBN-13: 1781006024

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

This Handbook will be an indispensable reference work for practitioners and scholars, as well as for those in an enforcement environment.

Hard Core Cartels Recent progress and challenges ahead

Author: OECD

Publisher: OECD Publishing

Published: 2003-05-27

Total Pages: 64

ISBN-13: 926410125X

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

This book reviews progress in the fight against hard core cartels. It quantifies the harm caused by cartels and identifies improved methods of investigation. It also examines progress in strengthening sanctions against businesses and individuals.

The Digital Economy and Competition Law in Asia

Author: Steven Van Uytsel

Publisher: Springer Nature

Published: 2021-05-06

Total Pages: 224

ISBN-13: 9811603243

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

The digital economy, broadly defined as the economy operating on the basis of interconnectivity between people and businesses, has gradually spread over the world. Although a global phenomenon, the digital economy plays out in local economic, political, and regulatory contexts. The problems thus created by the digital economy may be approached differently depending on the context. This edited collection brings together leading scholars based in Asia to detail how their respective jurisdictions respond to the competition law problems evolving out of the deployment of the digital economy. This book is timely, because it will show to what extent new competition law regimes or those with a history of lax enforcement can respond to these new developments in the economy. Academics in law and business strategies with an interest in competition law, both in Asia and more broadly, will find the insights in this edited collection invaluable. Further, this volume will be a key resource for scholars, practitioners and students.

The Economics of Collusion

Author: Robert C. Marshall

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 2012-04-27

Total Pages: 315

ISBN-13: 0262300737

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

An examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a stable and peaceful manner despite the illegality of their agreements and incentives for deviation by their members. In The Economics of Collusion, Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx offer an examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Marshall and Marx, who have studied collusion extensively for two decades, begin with three narratives: the organization and implementation of a cartel, the organization and implementation of a bidding ring, and a parent company's efforts to detect collusion by its divisions. These accounts—fictitious, but rooted in the inner workings and details from actual cases—offer a novel and engaging way for the reader to understand the basics of collusive behavior. The narratives are followed by detailed economic analyses of cartels, bidding rings, and detection. The narratives offer an engaging entrée to the more rigorous economic discussion that follows. The book is accessible to any reader who understands basic economic reasoning. Mathematical material is flagged with asterisks.

Auctions

Author: Timothy P. Hubbard

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 2016-01-06

Total Pages: 266

ISBN-13: 0262528533

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

How auctions work, in theory and practice, with clear explanations and real-world examples that range from government procurement to eBay. Although it is among the oldest of market institutions, the auction is ubiquitous in today's economy, used for everything from government procurement to selling advertising on the Internet to course assignment at MIT's Sloan School. And yet beyond the small number of economists who specialize in the subject, few people understand how auctions really work. This concise, accessible, and engaging book explains both the theory and the practice of auctions. It describes the main auction formats and pricing rules, develops a simple model to explain bidder behavior, and provides a range of real-world examples. The authors explain what constitutes an auction and how auctions can be modeled as games of asymmetric information—that is, games in which some players know something that other players do not. They characterize behavior in these strategic situations and maintain a focus on the real world by illustrating their discussions with examples that include not just auctions held by eBay and Sotheby's, but those used by Google, the U.S. Treasury, TaskRabbit, and charities. Readers will begin to understand how economists model auctions and how the rules of the auction shape bidder incentives. They will appreciate the role auctions play in our modern economy and understand why these selling mechanisms are so resilient.

Assetization

Author: Kean Birch

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 2020-07-14

Total Pages: 339

ISBN-13: 0262539179

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

How the asset—anything that can be controlled, traded, and capitalized as a revenue stream—has become the primary basis of technoscientific capitalism. In this book, scholars from a range of disciplines argue that the asset—meaning anything that can be controlled, traded, and capitalized as a revenue stream—has become the primary basis of technoscientific capitalism. An asset can be an object or an experience, a sum of money or a life form, a patent or a bodily function. A process of assetization prevails, imposing investment and return as the key rationale, and overtaking commodification and its speculative logic. Although assets can be bought and sold, the point is to get a durable economic rent from them rather than make a killing on the market. Assetization examines how assets are constructed and how a variety of things can be turned into assets, analyzing the interests, activities, skills, organizations, and relations entangled in this process. The contributors consider the assetization of knowledge, including patents, personal data, and biomedical innovation; of infrastructure, including railways and energy; of nature, including mineral deposits, agricultural seeds, and “natural capital”; and of publics, including such public goods as higher education and “monetizable social ills.” Taken together, the chapters show the usefulness of assetization as an analytical tool and as an element in the critique of capitalism. Contributors Thomas Beauvisage, Kean Birch, Veit Braun, Natalia Buier, Béatrice Cointe, Paul Robert Gilbert, Hyo Yoon Kang, Les Levidow, Kevin Mellet, Sveta Milyaeva, Fabian Muniesa, Alain Nadaï, Daniel Neyland, Victor Roy, James W. Williams

The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy

Author: Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 2017-11-16

Total Pages: 145

ISBN-13: 0262036932

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement. Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement. The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and enforcement. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. The book then considers the design of competition law and enforcement, examining such topics as the formula for penalties and leniency programs. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion.