Health Insurance

Health Insurance PDF

Author: Willard G. Manning

Publisher:

Published: 1997

Total Pages: 639

ISBN-13:

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Choosing optimal health insurance coverage involves a trade-off between the gain from risk reduction and the deadweight loss from moral hazard. This paper examines this trade-off empirically by estimating both the demand for health insurance and the demand for health services. It relies on data from a randomized controlled trial of cost-sharing's effects on the use of health services and on the health status for a general, non-elderly population.

Health Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Risk Pooling and Moral Hazard

Health Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Risk Pooling and Moral Hazard PDF

Author:

Publisher:

Published: 1989

Total Pages: 67

ISBN-13:

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Choosing economically optimal health insurance coverage involves a trade-off between risk reduction and the overuse of health care. The economic purpose of insurance is to reduce financial uncertainty or risk - the more health insurance lowers the risk, the greater will be the increase in social well-being. But increases in health insurance also increase the amount of medical care demand, because insurance lowers the out-of-pocket cost of health care - the larger the demand response of medical care to cost sharing, the greater the decrease in social well-being, due to the purchase of too much health care. This study examines this trade-off empirically by estimating both the demand for health insurance and the demand for health services. It relies on data from a randomized controlled trial of the cost sharing's effects on the use of health services and on the health status for a general, nonelderly (under age 65) population.

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance PDF

Author: Amy Finkelstein

Publisher: Columbia University Press

Published: 2014-12-02

Total Pages: 161

ISBN-13: 0231538685

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Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice

Estimating the tradeoff between risk protection and moral hazard with a nonlinear budget set model of health insurance

Estimating the tradeoff between risk protection and moral hazard with a nonlinear budget set model of health insurance PDF

Author: Amanda E. Kowalski

Publisher:

Published: 2012

Total Pages: 50

ISBN-13:

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Insurance induces a well-known tradeoff between the welfare gains from risk protection and the welfare losses from moral hazard. Empirical work traditionally estimates each side of the tradeoff separately, potentially yielding mutually inconsistent results. I develop a nonlinear budget set model of health insurance that allows for the calculation of both sides of the tradeoff simultaneously, allowing for a relationship between moral hazard and risk protection. An important feature of this model is that it considers nonlinearities in the consumer budget set that arise from deductibles, coinsurance rates, and stoplosses that alter moral hazard as well as risk protection relative to no insurance. I illustrate the properties of my model by estimating it using data on employer sponsored health insurance from a large firm. Within my empirical context, the average deadweight losses from moral hazard substantially outweigh the average welfare gains from risk protection. However, the welfare impact of moral hazard and risk protection are both small relative to transfers from the government through the tax preference for employer sponsored health insurance and transfers from some agents to other agents through a common premium.

Pooling Health Insurance Risks

Pooling Health Insurance Risks PDF

Author: Mark V. Pauly

Publisher: American Enterprise Institute

Published: 1999

Total Pages: 120

ISBN-13: 9780844741192

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Uncertainty about risks to health virtually requires that people have health insurance. But how is the cost of premiums determined? Should rates vary according to some indicators of risk? How much do premiums vary with risk? Do the young and the healthy actually subsidize the old and the unhealthy?

Health Reform without Side Effects

Health Reform without Side Effects PDF

Author: Mark V. Pauly

Publisher: Hoover Press

Published: 2013-09-01

Total Pages: 123

ISBN-13: 0817910468

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Mark V. Pauly offers a detailed look at the individual insurance market in the United States. He explains how it works, suggests approaches to improvement that build on what currently works well, and provides a realistic assessment of how much improvement we can demand and expect. He concludes that, although there are some serious deficiencies in today's individual insurance market, there are also some important advantages in this market that should be preserved.

Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging

Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging PDF

Author: John Piggott

Publisher: Elsevier

Published: 2016-11-21

Total Pages: 1146

ISBN-13: 0444634045

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Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging synthesizes the economic literature on aging and the subjects associated with it, including social insurance and healthcare costs, both of which are of interest to policymakers and academics. These volumes, the first of a new subseries in the Handbooks in Economics, describe and analyze scholarship created since the inception of serious attention began in the late 1970s, including information from general economics journals, from various field journals in economics, especially, but not exclusively, those covering labor markets and human resource issues, from interdisciplinary social science and life science journals, and from papers by economists published in journals associated with gerontology, history, sociology, political science, and demography, amongst others. Dissolves the barriers between policymakers and scholars by presenting comprehensive portraits of social and theoretical issues Synthesizes valuable data on the topic from a variety of journals dating back to the late 1970s in a convenient, comprehensive resource Presents diverse perspectives on subjects that can be closely associated with national and regional concerns Offers comprehensive, critical reviews and expositions of the essential aspects of the economics of population aging

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