Formal Models of Domestic Politics

Formal Models of Domestic Politics PDF

Author: Scott Gehlbach

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2021-09-30

Total Pages: 290

ISBN-13: 1108661335

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Formal Models of Domestic Politics offers a unified and accessible approach to canonical and important new models of politics. Intended for political science and economics students who have already taken a course in game theory, this new edition retains the widely appreciated pedagogic approach of the first edition. Coverage has been expanded to include a new chapter on nondemocracy; new material on valance and issue ownership, dynamic veto and legislative bargaining, delegation to leaders by imperfectly informed politicians, and voter competence; and numerous additional exercises. Political economists, comparativists, and Americanists will all find models in the text central to their research interests. This leading graduate textbook assumes no mathematical knowledge beyond basic calculus, with an emphasis placed on clarity of presentation. Political scientists will appreciate the simplification of economic environments to focus on the political logic of models; economists will discover many important models published outside of their discipline; and both instructors and students will value the classroom-tested exercises. This is a vital update to a classic text.

A Model Discipline

A Model Discipline PDF

Author: Kevin A. Clarke

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2012-02-16

Total Pages: 233

ISBN-13: 0195382196

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Political scientists use models to investigate and illuminate causal mechanisms, generate comparative data, and more. But how do we justify and rationalize the method? Why test predictions from a deductive, and thus truth-preserving, system? Primo and Clarke tackle these central questions in this novel work of methodology.

The Logic of Political Survival

The Logic of Political Survival PDF

Author: Bruce Bueno De Mesquita

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 2005-01-14

Total Pages: 602

ISBN-13: 0262261774

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The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not. The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically.

Political Game Theory

Political Game Theory PDF

Author: Nolan McCarty

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2014-10-30

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13: 9781107438637

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Political Game Theory is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various disciplines including comparative politics, international relations and American politics. Political Game Theory is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics, and traditional economics, however there are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are also provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed.

Positive Political Theory I

Positive Political Theory I PDF

Author: David Austen-Smith

Publisher: University of Michigan Press

Published: 2010-09-23

Total Pages: 224

ISBN-13: 0472022466

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Positive Political Theory I is concerned with the formal theory of preference aggregation for collective choice. The theory is developed as generally as possible, covering classes of aggregation methods that include such well-known examples as majority and unanimity rule and focusing in particular on the extent to which any aggregation method is assured to yield a set of "best" alternatives. The book is intended both as a contribution to the theory of collective choice and a pedagogic tool. Austen-Smith and Banks have made the exposition both rigorous and accessible to people with some technical background (e.g., a course in multivariate calculus). The intended readership ranges from more technically-oriented graduate students and specialists to those students in economics and political science interested less in the technical aspects of the results than in the depth, scope, and importance of the theoretical advances in positive political theory. "This is a stunning book. Austen-Smith and Banks have a deep understanding of the material, and their text gives a powerfully unified and coherent perspective on a vast literature. The exposition is clear-eyed and efficient but never humdrum. Even those familiar with the subject will find trenchant remarks and fresh insights every few pages. Anyone with an interest in contemporary liberal democratic theory will want this book on the shelf." --Christopher Achen, University of Michigan David Austen-Smith is Professor of Political Science, Professor of Economics, and Professor of Management and Strategy, Northwestern University. Jeffrey S. Banks is Professor of Political Science, California Institute of Technology.

Guide to the Scientific Study of International Processes

Guide to the Scientific Study of International Processes PDF

Author: Sara McLaughlin Mitchell

Publisher: John Wiley & Sons

Published: 2012-07-17

Total Pages: 463

ISBN-13: 1118277929

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Dedicated to the empirical analysis of data from the world of international relations, SSIP scholars tend to focus on interstate conflicts, civil wars, and conflict management. The range of perspectives in this edited volume provide a comprehensive introduction to SSIP theory and methodology. Fresh approach traces intellectual development of research approaches rather than merely summarizing results Features original SSIP material not found in other books Includes a number of essays with a broader assessment of SSIP methods - ideal for younger scholars interested in the approach Includes recent SSIP analyses exploring issues such as civil wars

The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies

The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies PDF

Author: Shane Martin

Publisher: Oxford Handbooks

Published: 2014

Total Pages: 785

ISBN-13: 0199653011

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Over the past five years, legislative studies have emerged as a field of inquiry in political science. Many political science associations, both national and international, have created standing sections on legislative studies. There has also been a proliferation of literature on legislatures and legislators. This book focuses on legislatures and how they matter, how they have adapted to changes such as globalization and judicialization, and how they have survived the transition to mass democracies.

The SAGE Handbook of Political Science

The SAGE Handbook of Political Science PDF

Author: Dirk Berg-Schlosser

Publisher: SAGE

Published: 2020-02-11

Total Pages: 2445

ISBN-13: 1529715431

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The SAGE Handbook of Political Science presents a major retrospective and prospective overview of the discipline. Comprising three volumes of contributions from expert authors from around the world, the handbook aims to frame, assess and synthesize research in the field, helping to define and identify its current and future developments. It does so from a truly global and cross-area perspective Chapters cover a broad range of aspects, from providing a general introduction to exploring important subfields within the discipline. Each chapter is designed to provide a state-of-the-art and comprehensive overview of the topic by incorporating cross-cutting global, interdisciplinary, and, where this applies, gender perspectives. The Handbook is arranged over seven core thematic sections: Part 1: Political Theory Part 2: Methods Part 3: Political Sociology Part 4: Comparative Politics Part 5: Public Policies and Administration Part 6: International Relations Part 7: Major Challenges for Politics and Political Science in the 21st Century

Interests, Institutions, and Information

Interests, Institutions, and Information PDF

Author: Helen V. Milner

Publisher: Princeton University Press

Published: 2020-06-30

Total Pages: 322

ISBN-13: 0691214492

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Increasingly scholars of international relations are rallying around the idea that "domestic politics matters." Few, however, have articulated precisely how or why it matters. In this significant book, Helen Milner lays out the first fully developed theory of domestic politics, showing exactly how domestic politics affects international outcomes. In developing this rational-choice theory, Milner argues that any explanation that treats states as unitary actors is ultimately misleading. She describes all states as polyarchic, where decision-making power is shared between two or more actors (such as a legislature and an executive). Milner constructs a new model based on two-level game theory, reflecting the political activity at both the domestic and international levels. She illustrates this model by taking up the critical question of cooperation among nations. Milner examines the central factors that influence the strategic game of domestic politics. She shows that it is the outcome of this internal game--not fears of other countries' relative gains or the likelihood of cheating--that ultimately shapes how the international game is played out and therefore the extent of cooperative endeavors. The interaction of the domestic actors' preferences, given their political institutions and levels of information, defines when international cooperation is possible and what its terms will be. Several test cases examine how this argument explains the phases of a cooperative attempt: the initiation, the negotiations at the international level, and the eventual domestic ratification. The book reaches the surprising conclusion that theorists--neo-Institutionalists and Realists alike--have overestimated the likelihood of cooperation among states.