-PDF Download- Fiscal Rules And The Sovereign Default Premium EBOOK

Fiscal Rules and the Sovereign Default Premium

Author: Juan Carlos Hatchondo

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2012-01-01

Total Pages: 28

ISBN-13: 1463933150

This paper finds optimal fiscal rule parameter values and measures the effects of imposing fiscal rules using a default model calibrated to an economy that in the absence of a fiscal rule pays a significant sovereign default premium. The paper also studies the case in which the government conducts a voluntary debt restructuring to capture the capital gains from the increase in its debt market value implied by a rule announcement. In addition, the paper shows how debt ceilings may reduce the procyclicality of fiscal policy and thus consumption volatility.

Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk

Author: Dr. Leonardo Martinez

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2011-03-01

Total Pages: 29

ISBN-13: 1455225045

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

We propose a modification to a baseline sovereign default framework that allows us to quantify the importance of debt dilution in accounting for the level and volatility of the interest rate spread paid by sovereigns. We measure the effects of debt dilution by comparing the simulations of the baseline model (with debt dilution) with the ones of the modified model without dilution. We calibrate the baseline model to mimic the mean and standard deviation of the spread, as well as the external debt level, the mean debt duration and a measure of default frequency in the data. We find that, even without commitment to future repayment policies and withoutcontingency of sovereign debt, if the sovereign could eliminate debt dilution, the number of default per 100 years decreases from 3.10 to 0.42. The mean spread decreases from 7.38% to 0.57%. The standard deviation of the spread decreases from 2.45 to 0.72. Default risk falls in part because of a reduction of the level of sovereign debt (36% of the face value and of 11% of the market value). But we show that the most important effect of dilution on default risk results from a shift in the set of government''s borrowing opportunities. Our analysis is also relevant for the study of other credit markets where the debt dilution problem could be present.

Fiscal Rules and the Sovereign Default Premium

Author: Juan Carlos Hatchondo

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2012-01-01

Total Pages: 28

ISBN-13: 1463948875

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

Sovereign Debt

Author: Mr. Leonardo Martinez

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2022-06-17

Total Pages: 47

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

This paper surveys the literature on sovereign debt from the perspective of understanding how sovereign debt differs from privately issue debt, and why sovereign debt is deemed safe in some countries but risky in others. The answers relate to the unique power of the sovereign. One the one hand, a sovereign has the power to tax, making debt relatively safe; on the other, it also has control over its territory and most of its assets, making debt enforcement difficult. The paper discusses debt contracts and the sovereign debt market, sovereign debt restructurings, and the empirical and theoretical literatures on the costs and causes of defaults. It describes the adverse impact of sovereign default risk on the issuing countries and what explains this impact. The survey concludes with a discussion of policy options to reduce sovereign risk, including fiscal frameworks that act as commitment devices, state-contingent debt, and independent and credible monetary policy.

Sovereign Default Risk, Fiscal Adjustment, and Debt Renegotiation

Author: Hyungseok Joo

Publisher:

Published: 2017

Total Pages: 42

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

This paper studies the effects of government capital accumulation on sovereign debt default risk and debt restructuring renegotiation outcomes when government has limited ability to extract revenues from households. We develop a quantitative dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of sovereign default, debt renegotiation, and fiscal policies, where government chooses between the fiscal instruments of government consumption and government investment. Government capital provides an additional means of adjustment in the face of a bad productivity shock. It also affects government's incentive to re-access the international credit market when a country chooses to default. We implement fiscal policies and rules that restrict foreign debt, especially focusing on how fiscal rules affect government spending dynamics. The model delivers three key predictions. (1) A higher level of government capital implies less risky sovereign debt and higher recovery rates when the government chooses to default. (2) A high debt to output ratio is possible with a sufficient level of government capital. (3) Fiscal adjustment that reduces public investment may be self-defeating.

Sovereign Debt

Author: Rob Quail

Publisher: John Wiley & Sons

Published: 2011-02-25

Total Pages: 435

ISBN-13: 1118017552

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

An intelligent analysis of the dangers, opportunities, and consequences of global sovereign debt Sovereign debt is growing internationally at a terrifying rate, as nations seek to prop up their collapsing economies. One only needs to look at the sovereign risk pressures faced by Greece, Spain, and Ireland to get an idea of how big this problem has become. Understanding this dilemma is now more important than ever, that's why Robert Kolb has compiled Sovereign Debt. With this book as your guide, you'll gain a better perspective on the essential issues surrounding sovereign debt and default through discussions of national defaults, systemic risk, associated costs, and much more. Historical studies are also included to provide a realistic framework of reference. Contains up-to-date research and analysis on sovereign debt from today's leading practitioners and academics Details the dangers of defaults and their associated systemic risks Explores the past, present, and future of sovereign debt The repercussions of a national default are all-encompassing as global markets are intricately interwoven in the modern world. Sovereign Debt examines what it will take to overcome the challenges of this market and how you can deal with the uncertainty surrounding it.

Essays on Sovereign Debt: Default, Fiscal Rules, and Bailouts

Author: Francisco Luis Roch

Publisher:

Published: 2012

Total Pages: 105

ISBN-13: 9781267438249

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

Chapter 3, which is a joint work with Harald Uhlig, provides a theoretical framework to analyze the dynamics of the sovereign debt crisis of a member country in a monetary union and the role of various bailout mechanisms. We analyze the unfolding and the debt dynamics, if debt pricing is left to markets alone. Next, we discuss the dynamics, if there is intervention by some bail-out mechanism. We characterize the minimal actuarily fair intervention that restores the "good" equilibrium of Cole-Kehoe, relying on the market to provide residual financing.

Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Debt Crisis and Management

Author: Mr.Cristiano Cantore

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2017-03-30

Total Pages: 44

ISBN-13: 1475590180

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

The initial government debt-to-GDP ratio and the government’s commitment play a pivotal role in determining the welfare-optimal speed of fiscal consolidation in the management of a debt crisis. Under commitment, for low or moderate initial government debt-to-GPD ratios, the optimal consolidation is very slow. A faster pace is optimal when the economy starts from a high level of public debt implying high sovereign risk premia, unless these are suppressed via a bailout by official creditors. Under discretion, the cost of not being able to commit is reflected into a quick consolidation of government debt. Simple monetary-fiscal rules with passive fiscal policy, designed for an environment with “normal shocks”, perform reasonably well in mimicking the Ramsey-optimal response to one-off government debt shocks. When the government can issue also long-term bonds–under commitment–the optimal debt consolidation pace is slower than in the case of short-term bonds only, and entails an increase in the ratio between long and short-term bonds.

Sovereign Risk and Belief-Driven Fluctuations in the Euro Area

Author: Giancarlo Corsetti

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2013-11-06

Total Pages: 49

ISBN-13: 1475516800

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

Sovereign risk premia in several euro area countries have risen markedly since 2008, driving up credit spreads in the private sector as well. We propose a New Keynesian model of a two-region monetary union that accounts for this “sovereign risk channel.” The model is calibrated to the euro area as of mid-2012. We show that a combination of sovereign risk in one region and strongly procyclical fiscal policy at the aggregate level exacerbates the risk of belief-driven deflationary downturns. The model provides an argument in favor of coordinated, asymmetric fiscal stances as a way to prevent selffulfilling debt crises.

Serial Sovereign Default

Author:

Publisher:

Published: 2021

Total Pages:

ISBN-13: 9789289949163

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

We confront five stylized facts related to sovereign default: 1) the presence of serial defaulters; 2) the prevalence of partial over complete default; 3) the counter-cyclicality of default; 4) non-linearity of sovereign spreads; and 5) heterogeneous outcomes among serial defaulters. In a model that integrates fiscal uncertainty and habit formation in policy, assuming incomplete financial markets,we demonstrate that default is habit and shock driven as well as non-strategic and involuntary. Moreover, there is no requirement for sanctions to sustain trading. In spite of dealing with serial defaulters, partial default is a robust equilibrium. We characterize good and bad fiscal habits and, that with the latter, expected default increases with habit persistence. The impact of habits on the expected default rate is the opposite of its effect on both the interest rate on public debt and base interest of the economy. The presence of habits also has implications for the cost of debt, default risk premium and the cost of default, and can shed light on country heterogeneities.