Fiscal Performance, Institutional Design and Decentralization in European Union Countries

Fiscal Performance, Institutional Design and Decentralization in European Union Countries PDF

Author: Mr.Julio Escolano

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2012-02-01

Total Pages: 32

ISBN-13: 1463943644

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This paper analyzes the impact of decentralization on overall fiscal performance in the European Union, taking into account fiscal institutional arrangements. We find that spending decentralization has been associated with sizably better fiscal performance, especially when transfer dependency of subnational governments is low. However, subnational fiscal rules do not seem to be associated with better performance.

Subnational Data Requirements for Fiscal Decentralization

Subnational Data Requirements for Fiscal Decentralization PDF

Author: Serdar Yilmaz

Publisher: World Bank Publications

Published: 2003-01-01

Total Pages: 172

ISBN-13: 9780821356999

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This publication has been produced as part of a capacity building programme to strengthen the ability of national statistical systems to collect subnational demographic, socio economic and fiscal data. This is important in the design of public policy options, particularly as subnational governments in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe become responsible for the delivery of local services. This publication contains case studies from five countries in Central and Eastern Europe that are at different stages of fiscal decentralisation (covering Bulgaria, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine).

Fiscal Performance, Institutional Design and Decentralization in European Union Countries

Fiscal Performance, Institutional Design and Decentralization in European Union Countries PDF

Author: Mr.Julio Escolano

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2012-02-01

Total Pages: 32

ISBN-13: 146393646X

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This paper analyzes the impact of decentralization on overall fiscal performance in the European Union, taking into account fiscal institutional arrangements. We find that spending decentralization has been associated with sizably better fiscal performance, especially when transfer dependency of subnational governments is low. However, subnational fiscal rules do not seem to be associated with better performance.

Fiscal Decentralization and the Efficiency of Public Service Delivery

Fiscal Decentralization and the Efficiency of Public Service Delivery PDF

Author: Moussé Sow

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2015-03-17

Total Pages: 30

ISBN-13: 1475564031

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This paper explores the impact of fiscal decentralization on the efficiency of public service delivery. It uses a stochastic frontier method to estimate time-varying efficiency coefficients and analyzes the impact of fiscal decentralization on those efficiency coefficients. The findings indicate that fiscal decentralization can improve the efficiency of public service delivery but only under specific conditions. First, the decentralization process requires adequate political and institutional environments. Second, a sufficient degree of expenditure decentralization seems necessary to obtain favorable outcomes. Third, decentralization of expenditure needs to be accompanied by sufficient decentralization of revenue. Absent those conditions, fiscal decentralization can worsen the efficiency of public service delivery.

Fiscal Federalism 2022 Making Decentralisation Work

Fiscal Federalism 2022 Making Decentralisation Work PDF

Author: OECD

Publisher: OECD Publishing

Published: 2021-12-20

Total Pages: 290

ISBN-13: 9264912959

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Fiscal Federalism 2022 surveys recent trends and policies in intergovernmental fiscal relations and subnational government. Accessible and easy-to-read chapters provide insight into: good practices in fiscal federalism; the design of fiscal equalisation systems; measuring subnational tax and spending autonomy; promoting public sector performance across levels of government; digitalisation challenges and opportunities; the role of subnational accounting and insolvency frameworks; funding and financing of local government public investment; and early lessons from the COVID-19 crisis for intergovernmental fiscal relations.

Fiscal Decentralization and Fiscal Policy Performance

Fiscal Decentralization and Fiscal Policy Performance PDF

Author: Moussé Sow

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2017-03-24

Total Pages: 29

ISBN-13: 1475588747

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This paper explores the impact of fiscal decentralization on fiscal policy performance in a large sample of advanced and developing economies. The findings suggest that a larger share of decentralized expenditure is associated with a stronger fiscal balance; however, fiscal decentralization can lead to more pro-cyclical fiscal policy. Thus, the design and pace of fiscal decentralization need to be tailored to the specificities of the economy. Countries that have already established strong accountablity and budget management capacity at the local level can benefit from fiscal decentralization. In contrast, in economies prone to large volatility from internal and external shocks, the central government may need to retain a sufficient share of expenditure and revenue to conduct counter-cyclical policies. Finally, the pace of expenditure and revenue decentralization should be aligned.

Designing a European Fiscal Union

Designing a European Fiscal Union PDF

Author: Mr.Carlo Cottarelli

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2014-12-05

Total Pages: 270

ISBN-13: 1138783226

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Does the European Union need closer fiscal integration, and in particular a stronger fiscal centre, to become more resilient to economic shocks? This book looks at the experience of 13 federal states to help inform the heated debate on this issue. It analyses in detail their practices in devolving responsibilities from the subnational to the central level, compares them to those of the European Union, and draws lessons for a possible future fiscal union in Europe. More specifically, this book tries to answer three sets of questions: What is the role of centralized fiscal policies in federations, and hence the size, features and functions of the central budget? What institutional arrangements are used to coordinate fiscal policy between the federal and subnational levels? What are the links between federal and subnational debt, and how have subnational financing crises been handled, when they occurred? These policy questions are critical in many federations, and central to the current discussions about future paths for the European Union. This book brings to the table new, practical insights through a systematic and comprehensive comparison of the EU fiscal framework with that of federal states. It also departs from the decentralization perspective that has been prominent in the literature by focusing on the role of the centre (which responsibilities are centralized at the federal level and how they are handled, rather than which functions belong to the local level). Such an approach is particularly relevant for the European Union, where a fiscal union would imply granting new powers to the centre.

Do Subnational Fiscal Rules Foster Fiscal Discipline? New Empirical Evidence from Europe

Do Subnational Fiscal Rules Foster Fiscal Discipline? New Empirical Evidence from Europe PDF

Author: Ananya Kotia

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2016-04-07

Total Pages: 37

ISBN-13: 1484322037

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This paper studies how fiscal rules interact with the intergovernmental fiscal framework to foster fiscal discipline among European subnational governments. We use political variables describing the fiscal attitudes of the central government as instruments to obtain consistent estimates of the impact of subnational fiscal rules on fiscal balances. The results suggest that the discipline-enhancing effect of fiscal rules is weaker when there are large “vertical fiscal imbalances” that is, large differences in revenue and spending assignments across the different levels of government. These findings imply that separate reforms to reduce excessive vertical fiscal imbalances complement a rules-based fiscal framework that is aimed at fostering fiscal discipline.