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Externalities. Incentives, and Economic Reforms

Author: International Monetary Fund

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 1990-01-01

Total Pages: 40

ISBN-13: 1451926472

The paper emphasizes the role of institutions and incentives in the presence of externalities. An economy with multiple public decision makers is likely to experience “overspending,” “undertaxing,” “overborrowing,” and “overinflation” unless effective institutions exist for overcoming coordination failure. External financing may weaken incentives for adjustment over the longer run unless assistance is made conditional on fundamental institutional reforms. The paper also analyzes reforms that strengthen incentives to provide effort. Uncertainty regarding future taxes reduces present effort and the responsiveness of output to market signals. In addition, the paper addresses the adverse effects of bank insurance and soft budget constraints.

What Price Incentives?

Author: Steven Kelman

Publisher: Praeger Pub Text

Published: 1981

Total Pages: 170

ISBN-13: 9780865690820

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Sets forth in a straightforward and sensible way the philosophical reasons for the non-economist's skepticism of the economist's view of the world. Its relevance extends beyond environmental issues to other areas where microeconomic theory is being applied to public policy. Kelman cites results to confirm his view that both opponents and supporters of economic incentives have important philosophical concerns. He takes the role of an advocate of the use of incentives in formulating an environmental policy. He also discusses political strategy from the point of view of the policy entrepreneur who is trying to get ideas adopted. Economists and non-economists alike will welcome this book as a bridge over a perceptual gap in an important area of policymaking.

Externalities, Incentives, and Economic Reforms

Author: Joshua Aizenman

Publisher:

Published: 1990

Total Pages: 62

ISBN-13:

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The paper emphasizes the role of institutions and incentives in the presence of externalities. An economy with multiple public decision makers is likely to experience "overspending," "undertaxing," "overborrowing," and "overinflation" unless effective institutions exist for overcoming coordination failure. External financing may weaken incentives for adjustment over the longer run unless assistance is made conditional on fundamental institutional reforms. The paper also analyses reforms that strengthen incentives to provide effort. Uncertainty regarding future taxes reduces present effort and the responsiveness of output to market signals. In addition, the paper addresses the adverse effects of bank insurance and soft budget constraints.

Fiscal Policy and Long-Term Growth

Author: International Monetary Fund

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2015-04-20

Total Pages: 257

ISBN-13: 1498344658

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This paper explores how fiscal policy can affect medium- to long-term growth. It identifies the main channels through which fiscal policy can influence growth and distills practical lessons for policymakers. The particular mix of policy measures, however, will depend on country-specific conditions, capacities, and preferences. The paper draws on the Fund’s extensive technical assistance on fiscal reforms as well as several analytical studies, including a novel approach for country studies, a statistical analysis of growth accelerations following fiscal reforms, and simulations of an endogenous growth model.

Social Design

Author: Walter Trockel

Publisher: Springer

Published: 2019-06-13

Total Pages: 348

ISBN-13: 9783319938080

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This book contains invited essays in memory of Leonid Hurwicz spanning a large area of economic, social and other sciences where the implementation or enforcement of institutions and rules requires the design of effective mechanisms. The foundations of these articles are set by social choice concepts; game theory; Nash, Bayesian and Walrasian equilibria; complete and incomplete information. Besides in-depth treatments of well-established parts of mechanism and implementation theory, contributions on novel directions deal, for instance, with a quantum approach to game and decision making under uncertainty; digitalization; and the design of block chain for trading. The outstanding competence and reputation of the authors reflect the appreciation of the fundamental contributions and the lasting admiration of the personality and the work of Leonid Hurwicz.

Externalities, Incentives, and Failure to Achieve National Objectives in Decentralized Economies

Author: Joshua Aizenman

Publisher:

Published: 1991

Total Pages: 38

ISBN-13:

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The purpose of this paper is to study why decentralized economies often fail to achieve national objective in the presence of externalities. The paper employs a two-period, open economy framework in which the central government allocates its tax revenues among a larger number of individual decision makers (e.g., provincial authorities or managers of state enterprises). The central government has only limited monitoring capacity, which gives individual decision makers the opportunity to commit to spend more than the incomes they are officially allocated. Our analysis suggests that adverse macroeconomic shocks reduce the likelihood that decentralized decision makers will behave in a manner that limits spending and inflation to national objectives. This is demonstrated for declines in the current or expected future levels of domestic output, for a rise in foreign interest rates, and for a reduction in the quantity of external credit. We next demonstrate that debt relief can promote a shift in the composition of spending toward the types of productive investments that generate positive externalities. This is not only because debt relief that expands the availability of current resources has positive direct income effects, but also because debt relief can promote a shift from opportunistic behavior to cooperation among individual decision makers.

How to Regulate

Author: Thomas A. Lambert

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2017-08-18

Total Pages: 279

ISBN-13: 1108293646

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Markets sometimes fail. But so do regulatory efforts to correct market failures. Sometimes regulations reach too far, condemning good activities as well as bad, and sometimes they don't reach far enough, allowing bad behavior to persist. In this highly instructive book, Thomas A. Lambert explains the pitfalls of both extremes while offering readers a manual of effective regulation, showing how the best regulation maximizes social welfare and minimizes social costs. Working like a physician, Lambert demonstrates how regulators should diagnose the underlying disease and identify its symptoms, potential remedies for it, and their side effects before selecting the regulation that offers the greatest net benefit. This book should be read by policymakers, students, and anyone else interested in understanding how the best regulations are crafted and why they work.

The World Bank Research Observer

Author:

Publisher:

Published: 2003

Total Pages: 300

ISBN-13:

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Structural Reforms and Economic Performance in Advanced and Developing Countries

Author: Mr.Jonathan David Ostry

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2009-10-15

Total Pages: 62

ISBN-13: 1589068181

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This volume examines the impact on economic performance of structural policies-policies that increase the role of market forces and competition in the economy, while maintaining appropriate regulatory frameworks. The results reflect a new dataset covering reforms of domestic product markets, international trade, the domestic financial sector, and the external capital account, in 91 developed and developing countries. Among the key results of this study, the authors find that real and financial reforms (and, in particular, domestic financial liberalization, trade liberalization, and agricultural liberalization) boost income growth. However, growth effects differ significantly across alternative reform sequencing strategies: a trade-before-capital-account strategy achieves better outcomes than the reverse, or even than a "big bang"; also, liberalizing the domestic financial sector together with the external capital account is growth-enhancing, provided the economy is relatively open to international trade. Finally, relatively liberalized domestic financial sectors enhance the economy's resilience, reducing output costs from adverse terms-of-trade and interest-rate shocks; increased credit availability is one of the key mechanisms.

The Soft Budget Constraint — The Emergence, Persistence and Logic of an Institution

Author: Gun Eriksson Skoog

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2013-04-18

Total Pages: 416

ISBN-13: 1475767935

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This is a story of the soft budget constraint. It seeks an answer to a paradox: the prevalence of the soft budget constraint in spite of the tremendous inefficiencies that it gives rise to, and its persistence in spite of reform of the system of which it is an integral part. The story aims at increasing our understanding of why the phenomenon exists. By studying the case of state in Tanzania before, during and after socialism, an explanation of the owned enterprises emergence, persistence and logic of the soft budget constraint is suggested. This introductory chapter presents an argument showing why this story is worth telling. It discusses the research topic and how the problem it presents is attacked. THE SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINT The soft budget constraint is today a popular metaphor. Originally it was seen as a characteristic of the socialist system. It refers to the tendency of primarily state-owned enterprises to have their liquidity gaps or losses accommodated by the state, or some other external funding body, and to the resulting expectations of such bail-out. The concept was coined by the Hungarian economist Hmos Kornai. ' He distinguishes between four major forms of external financial assistance that contribute to the soft budget constraint: soft subsidies, soft taxation, soft credit and soft 2 administrative pricing.