Eisenhower’s Pursuit Of Strategy:

Eisenhower’s Pursuit Of Strategy: PDF

Author: LTC Geoffrey C. De Tingo

Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing

Published: 2015-11-06

Total Pages: 71

ISBN-13: 1786253631

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Eisenhower preferred to build consensus for his military and national strategies by using multiple communication techniques to convey his intent. If consensus was not achieved, though, and his intent was not carried out he would aggressively move to eliminate the source of friction. This monograph will analyze four case studies to demonstrate that it is critically important for subordinates and peers to understand the influence of leadership styles on strategic decision makers. It will also argue that the consequences for not understanding strategic decision makers can mean the difference between individual, organizational or national success or failure. The four case studies will highlight the leadership styles that Eisenhower used when he pursued a strategy and how those leadership styles influenced his decision-making. The first case study is Eisenhower’s fight to control Allied strategic bombers to support Operation Overlord in 1944. Second is his fight to develop, implement and defend his New Look National Security Strategy in 1953. Third is how Eisenhower defended his administration’s Middle East foreign policy and finally his strategy to seek a peaceful solution to the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956.

Eisenhower's Pursuit of Strategy

Eisenhower's Pursuit of Strategy PDF

Author: U S Army Command and General Staff Coll

Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform

Published: 2014-08-18

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13: 9781500877781

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Eisenhower preferred to build consensus for his military and national strategies by using multiple communication techniques to convey his intent. If consensus was not achieved, though, and his intent was not carried out he would aggressively move to eliminate the source of friction. This monograph will analyze four case studies to demonstrate that it is critically important for subordinates and peers to understand the influence of leadership styles on strategic decision makers. It will also argue that the consequences for not understanding strategic decision makers can mean the difference between individual, organizational or national success or failure. The four case studies will highlight the leadership styles that Eisenhower used when he pursued a strategy and how those leadership styles influenced his decision-making. The first case study is Eisenhower's fight to control Allied strategic bombers to support Operation Overlord in 1944. Second is his fight to develop, implement and defend his New Look National Security Strategy in 1953. Third is how Eisenhower defended his administration's Middle East foreign policy and finally his strategy to seek a peaceful solution to the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956. Three frameworks are used in the construction of each case study. The first framework explains the reasons why Eisenhower pursued his strategies, how he would communicate his intent and then put together a team to help build towards a favorable consensus. The second shows how some of Eisenhower's key subordinates and peers resisted his intent and in cases would either actively deceive him or attempt to subvert his strategy. The final framework demonstrates the actions Eisenhower took to eliminate those sources of friction and threats. This monograph contains four principal conclusions to help subordinates and peers succeed by identifying and understanding the influence of leadership styles on strategic decision makers. Eisenhower believed strongly in the reasons behin.

How Ike Led

How Ike Led PDF

Author: Susan Eisenhower

Publisher: Macmillan + ORM

Published: 2020-08-11

Total Pages: 307

ISBN-13: 1250238781

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How Dwight D. Eisenhower led America through a transformational time—by a DC policy strategist, security expert and his granddaughter. Few people have made decisions as momentous as Eisenhower, nor has one person had to make such a varied range of them. From D-Day to Little Rock, from the Korean War to Cold War crises, from the Red Scare to the Missile Gap controversies, Ike was able to give our country eight years of peace and prosperity by relying on a core set of principles. These were informed by his heritage and upbringing, as well as his strong character and his personal discipline, but he also avoided making himself the center of things. He was a man of judgment, and steadying force. He sought national unity, by pursuing a course he called the "Middle Way" that tried to make winners on both sides of any issue. Ike was a strategic, not an operational leader, who relied on a rigorous pursuit of the facts for decision-making. His talent for envisioning a whole, especially in the context of the long game, and his ability to see causes and various consequences, explains his success as Allied Commander and as President. After making a decision, he made himself accountable for it, recognizing that personal responsibility is the bedrock of sound principles. Susan Eisenhower's How Ike Led shows us not just what a great American did, but why—and what we can learn from him today.

Dueling Visions

Dueling Visions PDF

Author: Ronald R. Krebs

Publisher: Texas A&M University Press

Published: 2001

Total Pages: 204

ISBN-13: 9781603447096

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The presidential election of 1952, unlike most others before and since, was dominated by foreign policy, from the bloody stalemate of Korea to the deepening menace of international communism. During the campaign, Dwight Eisenhower and his spokesmen fed the public's imagination with their promises to liberate the peoples of Eastern Europe and created the impression that in office they would undertake an aggressive program to roll back Soviet influence across the globe. But time and again during the 1950s, Eisenhower and his advisers found themselves powerless to shape the course of events in Eastern Europe: they mourned their impotence but did little. In "Dueling Visions," Ronald R. Krebs argues that two different images of Eastern Europe's ultimate status competed to guide American policy during this period: Finlandization and rollback. Rollback, championed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency, was synonymous with liberation as the public understood it--detaching Eastern Europe form all aspects of Soviet control. Surprisingly, the figure most often linked to liberation--Secretary of State John Foster Dulles --came to advocated a more subtle and measure policy that neither accepted the status quo nor pursued rollback. This American vision for the region held up the model of Finland, imagining a tier of states that would enjoy domestic autonomy and perhaps even democracy but whose foreign policy would toe the Soviet line. Krebs analyzes the conflicting logics and webs of assumptions underlying these dueling visions, and closely examines the struggles over these alternatives within the administration. Case studies of the American response to Stalin's death and to the Soviet--Yugoslav rapprochement reveal the eventual triumph of Finlandization both as vision and as policy. Finally, Krebs suggests the study's implications for international relations theory and contemporary foreign affairs.

Eisenhower As Strategist: the Coherent Use of Military Power in War and Peace

Eisenhower As Strategist: the Coherent Use of Military Power in War and Peace PDF

Author: Steven Metz

Publisher:

Published: 2012-12-07

Total Pages: 80

ISBN-13: 9781481195737

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In December 1941, Dwight Eisenhower was ordered to report for duty at the War Plans Division (OPD) of the War Department inWashington and thus began his ascent to the pinnacle of American strategy. Like many soldiers, this was not a journey he approached with enthusiasm. Eisenhower felt that having missedcombat in World War I hindered his career, and so found assignment to the War Department "a hard blow." But despite a plea to Brigadier General Haislip, Chief of the Personnel Division, Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall insisted Eisenhower was the proper man for the job. "By General Marshall's word," Eisenhower feared, "I was completely condemned to a desk job in Washington for the duration." Eisenhower's anxiety did not come solely from careerism. He knew that his training and experience only partially prepared him for the complexity, subtlety, ambiguity, and frequent confusion of high-level strategy. Though confident of his soldierly skills, he was not so automatically sure of his ability in a realm where political acumen and horizontal leadership mattered more than vertical command relationships. Confidence there would come later.

Eisenhower As Strategist

Eisenhower As Strategist PDF

Author: Steven Metz

Publisher:

Published: 2004-10-01

Total Pages: 88

ISBN-13: 9781410217547

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The facts of Dwight D. Eisenhower's military career are well-known. This does not mean, however, that there is nothing to be gained from a careful examination of his experience. Few if any American officers performed a wider array of strategic functions - he was a staff planner in the War Department, wartime commander of a massive coalition force, peacetime Chief of Staff, and Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Eisenhower was directly involved in a number of major transitions including the building of the wartime American Army, its demobilization following the war, and the resuscitation of American military strength during the initial years of the cold war. This means that Eisenhower's career can provide important lessons on how a coherent strategy should and should not be built during times of strategic transition. That is what this monograph begins to do. It is not intended to be a biography in the usual sense and thus offers no new facts or insights into Eisenhower's life. Instead it uses that life as a backdrop for exploring the broader essence of strategic coherence and draws lessons from Eisenhower's career that can help guide the strategic transition which the U.S. military now faces. WILLIAM A. STOFFT Major General, U.S. Army Commandant

The Most Reasonable Of Unreasonable Men: Eisenhower As Strategic General

The Most Reasonable Of Unreasonable Men: Eisenhower As Strategic General PDF

Author: Lt.-Cmdr. Todd A. Kiefer

Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing

Published: 2015-11-06

Total Pages: 109

ISBN-13: 1786256452

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This paper investigates General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s roles as strategist and strategic general during World War II. Eisenhower had zero combat experience and was still a colonel on the Army rolls when selected for four-star unified command. Yet, he fought and won the war in Europe on his own terms. He designed his own chain of command, drafted the terms for Allied cooperation and strategy, built the Allied command structure, disobeyed heads of state, engaged in military diplomacy with political enemies, and enforced his personal morality upon an entire theater of war. He was the field commander for four great campaigns including the first Allied effort in North Africa and the final drive from the English Channel to the Elbe. In his humble and disarming way, Eisenhower was the most unreasonable general of all time. This study concludes that Eisenhower was an unconventional military thinker whose success as strategic general was due primarily to his capacity for progressive and creative vision. His extraordinary personal energy, initiative, creativity, and integrity enabled him to translate his unique vision into reality.

Waging Peace

Waging Peace PDF

Author: Robert R. Bowie

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 1998-02-12

Total Pages: 330

ISBN-13: 0195362721

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Waging Peace offers the first fully comprehensive study of Eisenhower's "New Look" program of national security, which provided the groundwork for the next three decades of America's Cold War strategy. Though the Cold War itself and the idea of containment originated under Truman, it was left to Eisenhower to develop the first coherent and sustainable strategy for addressing the issues unique to the nuclear age. To this end, he designated a decision-making system centered around the National Security Council to take full advantage of the expertise and data from various departments and agencies and of the judgment of his principal advisors. The result was the formation of a "long haul" strategy of preventing war and Soviet expansion and of mitigating Soviet hostility. Only now, in the aftermath of the Cold War, can Eisenhower's achievement be fully appreciated. This book will be of much interest to scholars and students of the Eisenhower era, diplomatic history, the Cold War, and contemporary foreign policy.