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Author: Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt
Publisher: MIT Press
Published: 2008
Total Pages: 415
ISBN-13: 0262042541
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Explicit deposit insurance (DI) is widely held to be a crucial element of modern financial safety nets. This book draws on an original cross-country dataset on DI systems and design features to examine the impact of DI on banking behavior and assess the policy complications that emerge in developing countries.
Author: Asl? Demirgüç-Kunt
Publisher: World Bank Publications
Published: 2001
Total Pages: 42
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Explicit deposit insurance has been spreading rapidly in recent years, even to countries with low levels of financial and institutional development. Economic theory indicates that deposit-insurance design features interact--for good or ill--with country-specific elements of the financial and governmental contracting environment. This paper documents the extent of cross-country differences in deposit-insurance design and reviews empirical evidence on how particular design features affect private market discipline, banking stability, financial development, and the effectiveness of crisis resolution. This evidence challenges the wisdom of encouraging countries to adopt explicit deposit insurance without first stopping to assess and remedy weaknesses in their informational and supervisory environments.
Author: Asli Demirgüç-Kunt
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Published: 2014-07-03
Total Pages: 44
ISBN-13: 1498308317
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of deposit insurance arrangements as of 2013. We extend our earlier dataset by including recent adopters of deposit insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks’ assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. We also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks’ balance sheets. The data show that deposit insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which also triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-deposit liabilities and bank assets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of deposit insurance remains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward.
Author: Asli Demirgüç-Kunt
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Published: 2014-07-03
Total Pages: 44
ISBN-13: 1498354475
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of deposit insurance arrangements as of 2013. We extend our earlier dataset by including recent adopters of deposit insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks’ assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. We also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks’ balance sheets. The data show that deposit insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which also triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-deposit liabilities and bank assets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of deposit insurance remains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward.
Author: Ms.Edda Zoli
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Published: 2002-12-01
Total Pages: 35
ISBN-13: 1451874669
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →This paper argues that an optimal deposit insurance scheme would allow the level of insurance coverage to be determined by the market. Based on this principle, the paper proposes an insurance scheme that minimizes distortions and embodies fairness and credibility, two essential characteristics of a viable and effective deposit insurance scheme. Using a simple model for the determination of the optimal level of insurance coverage, it is shown that the optimal coverage is higher for developing compared to developed countries; a condition that is broadly satisfied by prevailing deposit insurance practices around the world.
Author: Edward J. Kane
Publisher:
Published: 2010
Total Pages: 38
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Explicit deposit insurance has been spreading rapidly in recent years, even to countries with low levels of financial and institutional development. Economic theory indicates that deposit-insurance design features interact--for good or ill--with country-specific elements of the financial and governmental contracting environment. This paper documents the extent of cross-country differences in deposit-insurance design and reviews empirical evidence on how particular design features affect private market discipline, banking stability, financial development, and the effectiveness of crisis resolution. This evidence challenges the wisdom of encouraging countries to adopt explicit deposit insurance without first stopping to assess and remedy weaknesses in their informational and supervisory environments.
Author: Robert J. Cull
Publisher: World Bank Publications
Published: 2001
Total Pages: 66
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →Do deposit insurance programs contribute to financial developmen? Yes, but only if the regulatory environment is sound.
Author: Asl? Demirgüç-Kunt
Publisher: World Bank Publications
Published: 1999
Total Pages: 42
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK →"Explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability-- the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak"--Cover.
