China Naval Modernization: Implications for U. S. Navy Capabilities

China Naval Modernization: Implications for U. S. Navy Capabilities PDF

Author: Ronald O'Rourke

Publisher: DIANE Publishing

Published: 2010-05

Total Pages: 33

ISBN-13: 1437928390

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Contents: (1) Scope, Sources, and Terminology; (2) Overview of China¿s Naval Modern.; Inception; Elements of Modern. Effort; Limitations and Weaknesses; Reasons for Modern. Effort; Elements of China¿s Naval Modern.; Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles; Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles; Subs.; Aircraft Carriers; Surface Combatants; Amphibious Ships; Maritime Surveill. and Targeting Systems; Operations Away From Home Waters; Comparing U.S. and Chinese Naval Capabilities; Potential Oversight Issues for Congress; China as a Defense-Planning Priority; (3) Potential Navy-Related Program Implications; Highly Capable Ships and Aircraft; Pacific Fleet¿s Share of the Navy; Homeporting Pacific Fleet Ships in Forward Locations; Larger vs. Smaller Ships.

China Naval Modernization

China Naval Modernization PDF

Author: Ronald O'Rourke

Publisher:

Published: 2015

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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This report focuses on the potential implications of China's naval modernization for future required U.S. Navy capabilities. Other CRS reports address separate issues relating to China. This report is based on unclassified open-source information.

China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities -- Background and Issues for Congress

China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities -- Background and Issues for Congress PDF

Author:

Publisher:

Published: 2005

Total Pages: 85

ISBN-13:

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Concern has grown in Congress and elsewhere about China's military modernization. The topic is an increasing factor in discussions over future required U.S. Navy capabilities. The issue for Congress addressed in this report is as follows: How should China's military modernization be factored into decisions about U.S. Navy programs? Several elements of China's military modernization have potential implications for future required U.S. Navy capabilities. These include theater-range ballistic missiles (TBMs), land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based aircraft, submarines, surface combatants, amphibious ships, naval mines, nuclear weapons, and possibly high-power microwave (HPM) devices. China's naval weaknesses include capabilities for operating in waters more distant from China, joint operations, C4ISR, long-range surveillance and targeting systems, anti-air warfare (AAW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), mine countermeasures (MCM), and logistics. Observers believe a near-term focus of China's military modernization is to field a force that can succeed in a short-duration conflict with Taiwan and act as an anti-access force to deter U.S. intervention or delay the arrival of U.S. forces, particularly naval and air forces, in such a conflict. China's naval modernization raises potential issues for Congress concerning the role of China in DoD and Navy planning; the size of the Navy; the Pacific Fleet's share of the Navy; forward homeporting of Navy ships in the Western Pacific; the number of aircraft carriers, submarines, and ASW-capable platforms; Navy missile defense, air-warfare, AAW, ASW, and mine warfare programs; Navy computer network security; and EMP hardening of Navy systems. This report will be updated as events warrant.

China Naval Modernization

China Naval Modernization PDF

Author: Congressional Research Congressional Research Service

Publisher: CreateSpace

Published: 2014-12-23

Total Pages: 132

ISBN-13: 9781505903782

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China is building a modern and regionally powerful Navy with a modest but growing capability for conducting operations beyond China's near-seas region. The question of how the United States should respond to China's military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is a key issue in U.S. defense planning. The question is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy's budget. As a part of the U.S. strategic rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region announced in January 2012, Department of Defense (DOD) planning is placing an increased emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region. Observers expect that, as a result, there will be a stronger emphasis in DOD planning on U.S. naval and air forces. Administration officials have stated that notwithstanding constraints on U.S. defense spending, DOD will seek to protect initiatives relating to the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries, including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States. In this sense, decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere. China's naval modernization effort encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems. China's naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises. Observers believe China's naval modernization effort is oriented toward developing capabilities for doing the following: addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; asserting or defending China's territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea; enforcing China's view that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ); displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific; and asserting China's status as a leading regional power and major world power. Consistent with these goals, observers believe China wants its military to be capable of acting as an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) force-a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in China's near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces. China may also use its navy for other purposes, such as conducting maritime security (including anti-piracy) operations, evacuating Chinese nationals in foreign countries when necessary, and conducting humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations.

China Naval Modernization

China Naval Modernization PDF

Author: Congressional Research Service

Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform

Published: 2017-04-03

Total Pages: 112

ISBN-13: 9781545111741

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China is building a modern and regionally powerful navy with a limited but growing capability for conducting operations beyond China's near-seas region. The question of how the United States should respond to China's military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is a key issue in U.S. defense planning. Observers of Chinese and U.S. military forces view China's improving naval capabilities as posing a potential challenge in the Western Pacific to the U.S. Navy's ability to achieve and maintain control of blue-water ocean areas in wartime-the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has faced since the end of the Cold War. More broadly, these observers view China's naval capabilities as a key element of an emerging broader Chinese military challenge to the long-standing status of the United States as the leading military power in the Western Pacific. China's naval modernization effort encompasses a broad array of platform and weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems. China's naval modernization effort also includes improvements in maintenance and logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises. Observers believe China's naval modernization effort is oriented toward developing capabilities for doing the following: addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; asserting or defending China's territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea; enforcing China's view that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ); defending China's commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs); displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific; and asserting China's status as a leading regional power and major world power. Consistent with these goals, observers believe China wants its military to be capable of acting as an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) force-a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in China's near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces. Additional missions for China's navy include conducting maritime security (including anti-piracy) operations, evacuating Chinese nationals from foreign countries when necessary, and conducting humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations. Potential oversight issues for Congress include the following: whether the U.S. Navy in coming years will be large enough and capable enough to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime A2/AD forces while also adequately performing other missions around the world; whether the Navy's plans for developing and procuring long-range carrier-based aircraft and long-range ship- and aircraft-launched weapons are appropriate; whether the Navy can effectively counter Chinese ASBMs and submarines; and whether the Navy, in response to China's maritime A2/AD capabilities, should shift over time to a more distributed fleet architecture.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans PDF

Author: Ronald O'Rourke

Publisher: DIANE Publishing

Published: 2011

Total Pages: 43

ISBN-13: 1437930573

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This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. Contents: (1) Introduction; (2) Background: Proposed 313-Ship Fleet; FY 2010 Shipbuilding Request; (3) Oversight Issues for Congress: Adequacy of Proposed 313-Ship Fleet: Adequacy of Shipbuilding Plan for Maintaining 313 Ships; Shortfalls Relative to 313-Ship Goals; Affordability of Shipbuilding Plan; (4) Legislative Activity for FY 2010: FY 2010 Defense Authorization Act; FY 2010 DoD Appropriations Act; Resolution Directing Submission of FY 2010 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan; Legislation on Individual Shipbuilding Programs. Appendixes: (A) December 2009 Press Reports About Draft FY 2011 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan; (B) Adequacy of Planned 313-Ship Fleet; (C) Size of the Navy and Navy Shipbuilding Rate. Charts and tables.

China's Military and Naval Forces

China's Military and Naval Forces PDF

Author: Heidi Watson

Publisher: Nova Science Publishers

Published: 2016

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13: 9781634846936

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China is building a modern and regionally powerful military with a modest but growing capability for conducting operations away from China's immediate periphery. The question of how the United States should respond to China's military modernisation effort is a central issue in U.S. defense planning and foreign policy. Congress' decisions on this issue could affect U.S. defense strategy, budgets, plans, and programs, and the U.S. defense industrial base. This book provides a brief overview of the Chinese military. It provides background information and issues for Congress on China's naval modernisation effort and its implications for U.S. Navy capabilities.

Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles

Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles PDF

Author: Ronald O'Rourke

Publisher:

Published: 2019-06-24

Total Pages: 30

ISBN-13: 9781075833274

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The Navy wants to develop and procure three new types of unmanned vehicles (UVs) in FY2020 and beyond-Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles (LUSVs), Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles (MUSVs), and Extra-Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (XLUUVs). The Navy is requesting $628.8 million in FY2020 research and development funding for these three UV programs and their enabling technologies. The Navy wants to acquire these three types of UVs (which this report refers to collectively as large UVs) as part of an effort to shift the Navy to a new fleet architecture (i.e., a new combination of ships and other platforms) that is more widely distributed than the Navy's current architecture. Compared to the current fleet architecture, this more-distributed architecture is to include proportionately fewer large surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers), proportionately more small surface combatants (i.e., frigates and Littoral Combat Ships), and the addition of significant numbers of large UVs. The Navy wants to employ accelerated acquisition strategies for procuring these large UVs, so as to get them into service more quickly. The emphasis that the Navy placed on UV programs in its FY2020 budget submission and the Navy's desire to employ accelerated acquisition strategies in acquiring these large UVs together can be viewed as an expression of the urgency that the Navy attaches to fielding large UVs for meeting future military challenges from countries such as China. The LUSV program is a proposed new start project for FY2020. The Navy wants to procure two LUSVs per year in FY2020FY2024. The Navy wants LUSVs to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable ships based on commercial ship designs, with ample capacity for carrying various modular payloads-particularly anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and strike payloads, meaning principally anti-ship and land-attack missiles. The Navy reportedly envisions LUSVs as being 200 feet to 300 feet in length and having a full load displacement of about 2,000 tons. The MUSV program began in FY2019. The Navy plans to award a contract for the first MUSV in FY2019 and wants to award a contract for the second MUSV in FY2023. The Navy wants MUSVs, like LUSVs, to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable ships that can accommodate various payloads. Initial payloads for MUSVs are to be intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) payloads and electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Navy defines MUSVs as having a length of between 12 meters (about 39 feet) and 50 meters (about 164 feet). The Navy wants to pursue the MUSV program as a rapid prototyping effort under what is known as Section 804 acquisition authority. The XLUUV program, also known as Orca, was established to address a Joint Emergent Operational Need (JEON). The Navy wants to procure nine XLUUVs in FY2020-FY2024. The Navy announced on February 13, 2019, that it had selected Boeing to fabricate, test, and deliver the first four Orca XLUUVs and associated support elements. On March 27, 2019, the Navy announced that the award to Boeing had been expanded to include the fifth Orca. The Navy's large UV programs pose a number of oversight issues for Congress, including issues relating to the analytical basis for the more-distributed fleet architecture; the Navy's accelerated acquisition strategies and funding method for these programs; technical, schedule, and cost risk in the programs; the proposed annual procurement rates for the programs; the industrial base implications of the programs; the personnel implications of the programs; and whether the Navy has accurately priced the work it is proposing to do in FY2020 on the programs.