Central Bank Independence, Regulations, and Monetary Policy

Central Bank Independence, Regulations, and Monetary Policy PDF

Author: Ranajoy Ray Chaudhuri

Publisher: Springer

Published: 2018-10-29

Total Pages: 400

ISBN-13: 1137589124

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This book examines the linkage between central bank structure, central bank autonomy—with respect to setting its monetary policy goals, choosing its policy mechanisms, legal independence, and financial independence—and monetary policy, both in select benchmark countries and at a broader theoretical level. Country-specific chapters on the US, UK, Germany, Greece, Russia, India, China, Japan, Brazil, and South Africa focus on the history, administrative structure, and independence of the central monetary authority in these countries. The chapters go on to explore the countries’ conduct of monetary policy, their interplay with political forces and the wider economy, their currency, and their macroeconomic outcomes. The book will appeal to researchers, students of economics, finance and business, as well as general readers with an interest in the subject.

Central Bank Independence and Macro-Prudential Regulation

Central Bank Independence and Macro-Prudential Regulation PDF

Author: Mr.Kenichi Ueda

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2012-04-01

Total Pages: 27

ISBN-13: 1475502915

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We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when the central bank is politically independent. We then consider the role of political pressures in the spirit of Barro and Gordon (1983). We show that if either the macro-prudential regulator or the central bank (or both) are not politically independent, separation of price and financial stability objectives does not deliver the social optimum.

Central Bank Independence

Central Bank Independence PDF

Author: Jan Kleineman

Publisher: BRILL

Published: 2021-10-18

Total Pages: 238

ISBN-13: 9004481303

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In December 1999, prior to the forming of a Stockholm Centre for Commercial Law, an international symposium entitled Central Bank Independence was held at the Department of Law at Stockholm University in co-operation with the Swedish Central Bank (The Riksbank) and Queen Mary and Westfield College, London University. The participants were principally political, economic and legal specialists in the field, all with considerable international experience. This led to the topic being examined in detail from many different perspectives. This publication includes contributions by the participants and contains many important facts for those readers who wish to study and understand the different consequences of the yielding of control over financial policymaking by the traditional political organisations to a body of experts. For readers in some countries, who realise that the subject will revolutionise traditional Constitutional and Administrative Law, the topic and therefore this publication, cannot be ignored.

Central Bank Independence, Targets, and Credibility

Central Bank Independence, Targets, and Credibility PDF

Author: Francesco Lippi

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

Published: 1999-01-27

Total Pages: 180

ISBN-13: 9781782542971

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This book integrates new political and economic elements into the analysis of monetary policy credibility and central bank independence. The author considers imperfect monetary control, rational voters, distributional issues and uncertainty about future policy objectives in his welfare analysis of central banking. The role played by the different institutional elements that contribute to the making of an independent central bank is also assessed. A distinction is made between central bank independence and targets offering new insights into how a more inflation averse monetary policy may actually be achieved. Finally, explanations for the variation of central bank independence and conservatism across different countries are provided. This book will appeal to researchers, academics and policy makers in the fields of monetary policy, financial economics, money and banking and political economy.

Institutions and Monetary Policy

Institutions and Monetary Policy PDF

Author: Eric Schaling

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

Published: 1995

Total Pages: 288

ISBN-13:

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Central bank independence is a key issue for political and monetary authorities in many countries. In this text, the author looks at the impact of different central banks on price stability and macroeconomic performance, and their optimal degree of legislative independence.

Central Bank Independence and Monetary Stability

Central Bank Independence and Monetary Stability PDF

Author: Otmar Issing

Publisher:

Published: 1993

Total Pages: 42

ISBN-13:

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Central bank independence is now a major issue in debates about institutional reforms designed to improve economic performance. Professor Issing's paper is notable for its scholarly discussion of the meaning of 'independence' and his analysis of its effects. Moreover, because of his position inside the Bundesbank which is among the most independent of central banks and which provides a model for the constitution of the proposed European Central Bank he writes with a degree of expertise not available to most authors. Interest in central bank independence arose from the world-wide acceleration of inflation in the 1 970s which stimulated interest in means of 'anchoring' anti-inflation policy. Germany was in advance of other countries in recognising the importance of price stability and es-tablishing an institution to produce it, making the Bundesbank independent in 1957. Professor Issing argues that when independence is coupled with a price stability objective, economic performance appears to improve. Not only is inflation lower, but there is evidence that real growth is higher. In his view, central bank independence comes 'top of the list' of institutional arrangements designed to safeguard the stability of money.

Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics

Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics PDF

Author: Christopher Adolph

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2013-04-15

Total Pages: 389

ISBN-13: 1139620533

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Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.

Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision

Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision PDF

Author: S. Eijffinger

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

Published: 2011-01-01

Total Pages: 673

ISBN-13: 1849805768

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ÔThis Handbook is a must read for policy makers and practitioners alike as well as excellent reading for advanced academic courses in international banking.Õ Ð Allard Bruinshoofd, SUERF ÔThis collection of papers is essential reading for anyone interested in central banking, regulation and supervision. Sylvester Eijffinger and Donato Masciandaro have brought together contributions from the leading academics, central bankers and regulators, providing the most up-to-date analysis of this critical subject.Õ Ð Paul Mizen, University of Nottingham, UK This stimulating and original Handbook offers an updated and systematic discussion of the relationship between central banks, financial regulation and supervision after the global financial crisis. The crisis has raised new questions about the compatibility of monetary and financial stability, which are changing the face of central banking and its relationships with the architecture of financial regulation and supervision. The Handbook explores on both the economics and political economy of the topic, in order to understand how and why reforms of the role of the central banks can be designed and implemented. The general suggestion is that future effectiveness of the central banking architecture will depend on its ability to ensure the consistency between the monetary actions in normal and extraordinary times. Consequently the possible paths in the central bank strategies and tactics, as well as in the classic concepts of independence, accountability and transparency, are analyzed and discussed. With chapters written by outstanding scholars in economics, this lucid Handbook will appeal to academics, policymakers and practitioners, ranging from central bankers and supervisory authorities to financial operators. Among the academics it would be of particular interest to financial and monetary economists (including postgraduate students), but the institutional slant and the central theme of relations between economics, institutional settings and politics will also be invaluable for political scientists.

Monetary Policy in the New Normal

Monetary Policy in the New Normal PDF

Author: Mr.Tamim Bayoumi

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2014-04-04

Total Pages: 49

ISBN-13: 1475516495

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The proposed SDN would take stock of the current debate on the shape that monetary policy should take after the crisis. It revisits the pros and cons of expanding the objectives of monetary policy, the merits of turning unconventional policies into conventional ones, how to make monetary policy frameworks more resilient to the risk of being constrained by the zero-lower bound going forward, and the institutional challenges to preserve central bank independence with regards to monetary policy, while allowing adequate government oversight over central banks’ new responsibilities. It will draw policy conclusions where consensus has been reached, and highlight the areas where more work is needed to get more granular policy advice.

Central Bank Independence and the Conduct of Monetary Policy in the United Kingdom

Central Bank Independence and the Conduct of Monetary Policy in the United Kingdom PDF

Author: Mr.Jan Kees Martijn

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 1999-12-01

Total Pages: 23

ISBN-13: 145185840X

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The U.K. monetary policy framework, which combines inflation targeting with operational independence, provides a suitable arrangement for focused and credible monetary policy. However, potential weaknesses could result from features that have not yet been fully tested: the credibility and transparency of the inflation forecasts, which form the core of policy decisions, have diminished as a result of independence; and the framework could encourage excessive activism and frequent changes in interest rates. Although policy coordination could also suffer from independence, the new partly rules-based fiscal and monetary regimes will promote overall macroeconomic stability.