Appeasement Reconsidered: Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s

Appeasement Reconsidered: Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s PDF

Author:

Publisher: DIANE Publishing

Published: 2005

Total Pages: 60

ISBN-13: 1428916245

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The appeasement of Nazi Germany by the western democracies during the 1930s and the subsequent outbreak of World War II have been a major referent experience for U.S. foreign policymakers since 1945. From Harry Truman's response to the outbreak of the Korean War to George W. Bush's decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein, American presidents have repeatedly affirmed the lesson of Munich and invoked it to justify actual or threatened uses of force. However, the conclusion that the democracies could easily have stopped Hitler before he plunged the world into war and holocaust, but lacked the will to do so, does not survive serious scrutiny. Appeasement proved to be a horribly misguided policy against Hitler, but this conclusion is clear only in hindsight i.e., through the lens of subsequent events. Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at appeasement within the context of the political and military environments in which British and French leaders operated during the 1930s. He examines the nature of appeasement, the factors underlying Anglo-French policies toward Hitler from 1933 to 1939, and the reasons for the failure of those policies. He finds that Anglo-French security choices were neither simple nor obvious, that hindsight has distorted judgments on those choices, that Hitler remains without equal as a state threat, and that invocations of the Munich analogy should always be closely examined. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to the national security debate over the use of force to advance the objectives of U.S. foreign policy.

Appeasement Reconsidered

Appeasement Reconsidered PDF

Author: Jeffrey Record

Publisher: Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War College

Published: 2005

Total Pages: 64

ISBN-13:

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U.S. use of force since 1945 has been significantly influenced by the perceived consequences of appeasing Hitler in the 1930s, and from the mid-1970s to 2001 by the chilling effect of the Vietnam War. As the United States approached its second war with Iraq, proponents cited the Munich analogy to justify the war, whereas opponents argued that the United States was risking another Vietnam. Though reasoning by historical analogies is inherently dangerous, an examination of the threat parallels between Hitler and Saddam Hussein, and between the Vietnam War and the situation the United States has confronted in post-Baathist Iraq, reveals that the Munich analogy was misused as an argument for war, whereas the American dilemma in Iraq bears some important analogies to the Vietnam conflict, especially with respect to the challenges of state-building and sustaining domestic public support for an unpopular protracted war.

Securitizing Balance of Power Theory

Securitizing Balance of Power Theory PDF

Author: Ilai Z. Saltzman

Publisher: Lexington Books

Published: 2012

Total Pages: 367

ISBN-13: 0739170716

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Securitizing Balance of Power Theory: A Polymorphic Reconceptualization by Ilai Z. Saltzman presents a cutting-edge attempt to re-conceptualize one of the fundamental concepts of International Relations theory--balance of power theory--by examining insights from historical analysis of interwar and post-Cold War cases.

Reading Hitler's Mind

Reading Hitler's Mind PDF

Author: Norman Ridley

Publisher: Frontline Books

Published: 2022-07-20

Total Pages: 183

ISBN-13: 1399086308

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Most strongly associated with Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, it is often stated that Britain’s policy of appeasement was instituted in the 1930s in the hope of avoiding war with Hitler’s Nazi Germany. At the time, appeasement was viewed by many as a popular and seemingly pragmatic policy. In this book the author sets out to show how appeasement was not a naïve attempt to secure a lasting peace by resolving German grievances, but a means of buying time for rearmament. By the middle of the 1930s, British policy was based on the presumption that the balance of power had already dramatically shifted in Germany’s favour. It was felt that Britain, chiefly for economic reasons, was unable to restore the balance, and that extensive concessions to Germany would not satisfy Hitler, whose aggressive policies intensified the already high risk of war.. The only realistic option, and one that was clearly adopted by Neville Chamberlain, was to try to influence the timing of the inevitable military confrontation and, in the meantime, pursue a steady and economically sustainable program of rearmament. Appeasement would ‘buy’ that time for the British government. Crucially this strategy required continuously updated and accurate information about the strength, current and future, of the German armed forces, especially the Luftwaffe, and an understanding of their military strategy. Piercing the Nazis’ veil of secrecy was vital if the intelligence services were to build up a true picture of the extent of German rearmament and the purposes to which it might be put. The many agents, codebreakers, and counter-espionage personnel played a vital role in maximising the benefits that appeasement provided – even as war clouds continued to gather. These individuals were increasingly handed greater responsibility in a bid to inform British statesmen now scrambling to prepare for a catastrophic confrontation with Germany. In Reading Hitler’s Mind, Norman Ridley reveals the remarkable efforts made by the tiny, underfunded and often side-lined British intelligence services as they sought to inform those whose role it was to make decisions upon which the wheels of history turned.

Appeasement Reconsidered

Appeasement Reconsidered PDF

Author: Jeffrey Record

Publisher: Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War College

Published: 2005

Total Pages: 64

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

U.S. use of force since 1945 has been significantly influenced by the perceived consequences of appeasing Hitler in the 1930s, and from the mid-1970s to 2001 by the chilling effect of the Vietnam War. As the United States approached its second war with Iraq, proponents cited the Munich analogy to justify the war, whereas opponents argued that the United States was risking another Vietnam. Though reasoning by historical analogies is inherently dangerous, an examination of the threat parallels between Hitler and Saddam Hussein, and between the Vietnam War and the situation the United States has confronted in post-Baathist Iraq, reveals that the Munich analogy was misused as an argument for war, whereas the American dilemma in Iraq bears some important analogies to the Vietnam conflict, especially with respect to the challenges of state-building and sustaining domestic public support for an unpopular protracted war.

IR Theory, Historical Analogy, and Major Power War

IR Theory, Historical Analogy, and Major Power War PDF

Author: Hall Gardner

Publisher: Springer

Published: 2018-12-21

Total Pages: 339

ISBN-13: 3030046362

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This book critically examines elements of America-First nationalism, neo-conservatism, neo-realism, neo-liberalism, environmental theories, and social constructionism by way of developing an “alternative realist” approach to the study of the origins of major power war. The author critiques concepts of “polarity” and “sovereign” decision making and diplomacy before developing the concept of “highly uneven polycentrism.” The book then develops a unique comparative historical approach that seeks to compare and contrast the pre-World War I, pre-World War II, and Cold War eras with the contemporary post-Cold War period. It is argued that the US, as it remains the leading global hegemon, must fully engage in multilateral diplomacy with major friends and rivals alike in the establishment of differing forms of power sharing and joint sovereignty accords—in order to prevent the global system from polarizing into two contending alliances more reminiscent of both the pre-World War I and pre-World War II periods than the “new Cold War.”

War, Peace and International Relations

War, Peace and International Relations PDF

Author: Colin S. Gray

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2007-06-11

Total Pages: 471

ISBN-13: 1134169507

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This new volume explores the theory and practice of war and peace in modern historical context. In fifteen clear and concise chapters, this book hits the high and low points of international politics over a two hundred year period, plus a brief foray into the future out to 2025. War, Peace and International Relations serves as an excellent introduction to the international history of the past two centuries, showing how those two centuries were shaped and reshaped extensively by war. This book takes a broad view of what was relevant to the causes, courses, and consequences of wars. This upper-level textbook is an invaluable resource for students of strategic studies, security studies, international relations and international history.

The Third Reich's Macroeconomic Policies: Enablers Of Genocide

The Third Reich's Macroeconomic Policies: Enablers Of Genocide PDF

Author: Major Adam W. Grein II

Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing

Published: 2014-08-15

Total Pages: 92

ISBN-13: 1782897992

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The purpose of this study is to identify relationships between Nazi Macroeconomic policy and its ability to enable genocide. This study uses primary source documentation from newspapers, historical documents and published works to examine Nazi ideology as it relates to economics and macroeconomic policy. Accompanying this research is an analysis of steps the United States could have taken to stop or deter Nazi economic policy using the Mass Atrocities Prevention and Response Handbook’s economic planning guidance.

The Limits of U.S. Military Capability

The Limits of U.S. Military Capability PDF

Author: James H. Lebovic

Publisher: JHU Press

Published: 2010-06-30

Total Pages: 311

ISBN-13: 0801897505

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Political scientist James H. Lebovic establishes that the size, strength, flexibility, and adaptability of the U.S. military cannot ensure victory in asymmetrical conflicts. In The Limits of U.S. Military Capability, Lebovic shows how political and psychological factors trumped U.S. military superiority in Vietnam and Iraq, where inappropriate strategies, low stakes, and unrealistic goals mired the United States military in protracted, no-win conflicts. Lebovic contends that the United States is at a particular disadvantage when fighting a counterinsurgency without the full support of the host government; when leveraging various third parties (the adversary's foreign allies, societal leaders, and indigenous populations); when attempting to build coalitions and nations while involved in combat; and when sustaining government and public support at home when costs rise and benefits decline. Lebovic cautions against involving the U.S. military in operations without first considering U.S. stakes and suggests that the military take a less-is-more approach when choosing to employ force. Ambitious goals bring higher costs, unexpected results, diminished options, and a greater risk of failure. Rejecting the heavy-handed approach that is typical of most comparisons between the Vietnam and Iraq wars, The Limits of U.S. Military Capability carefully assesses evidence to develop lessons applicable to other conflicts—especially the ongoing war in Afghanistan.