An Analysis of Manstein’s Winter Campaign on the Russian Front 1942-1943:

An Analysis of Manstein’s Winter Campaign on the Russian Front 1942-1943: PDF

Author: Lt.-Col. Lawrence L. Izzo

Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing

Published: 2015-11-06

Total Pages: 103

ISBN-13: 1786254646

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

This study is a historical analysis of the campaign waged by Field Marshal von Manstein on the Russian southern front during the winter 1942-43. The study begins just after the 6th Army’s encirclement in Stalingrad and describes the four principal phases of Manstein’s campaign: the attempted relief of the 6th Army; the protection of Army Group A as it disengaged from the Caucasus; the prevention of Manstein’s lines of communications from being cut; and the counterblow to regain the initiative. The lessons learned from the campaign provide a perspective of battle at the operational level of war. The factors leading to Manstein’s success are discussed and include: superior generalship at the operational level; superior tactical maturity of the Germans; and German tactical and operational agility. The study describes the transition from the operational defensive to the operational offensive and how a defender can have the initiative. Manstein’s use of depth is explained. The concepts of center of gravity and operational art as they pertain to this campaign are also described. The study concludes with the implications of the lessons learned for a NATO-Soviet conflict in a central European scenario. The study points out that Manstein demonstrated that victory is possible even when forced to react to the enemy’s plan. The ability of NATO to replicate, today, the agility of Manstein’s forces and the synchronization achieved by his commanders is questioned. The implications of NATO’s lack of operational depth, in contrast to Manstein, are described. The impact of changes in force design since World War II are also explained.

An Analysis of Manstein's Winter Campaign on the Russian Front, 1942-1943: A Perspective of the Operational Level of War and Its Implications

An Analysis of Manstein's Winter Campaign on the Russian Front, 1942-1943: A Perspective of the Operational Level of War and Its Implications PDF

Author: Lawrence L. Izzo

Publisher:

Published: 1986

Total Pages: 90

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

The study begins just after the 6th Army's encirclement in Stalingrad and describes the four principal phases of Manstein's campaign: the attempted relief of the 6th Army; the protection of Army Group A as it disengaged from the Caucasus; the prevention of Manstein's lines of communication from being cut; and the counterblow to regain the initiative. The lessons learned from the campaign provide a perspective of battle at the operational level of war. The factors leading to Manstein's success are discussed and include: superior generalship at the operational level; superior tactical maturity of the Germans; and German tactical and operational agility. The study describes the transition from the operational defensive to the operational offensive and how a defender can have the initiative. Manstein's use of depth is explained. The concepts of center of gravity and operational art as they pertain to this campaign are also described. The study concludes with the implications of the lessons learned for a NATO-Soviet conflict in a central European scenario. The study points out that Manstein demonstrated that victory is possible even when forced to react to the enemy's plan. The ability of NATO to replicate, today, the agility of Manstein's forces and the synchronization achieved by his commanders is questioned. The implications of NATO's lack of operational depth, in contrast to Manstein, are described. The impact of changes in force design since World War II are also explained.

Manstein’s Campaigns - More Than Tactics

Manstein’s Campaigns - More Than Tactics PDF

Author: Major Walter J. Wood

Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing

Published: 2015-11-06

Total Pages: 87

ISBN-13: 1786251965

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

The purpose of this paper is to analyze selected campaigns/operations of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein in order to draw lessons from those campaigns as they relate to command, control, communications (C3) and logistics — subjects of immediate and relevant interest to those who take up the profession of arms. But all too often, histories of battles, campaigns and entire conflicts neglect the treatment of these areas. And when these factors are dealt with, the treatment they receive is likely to be rather shallow, lacking the depth necessary for the student to analyze these factors/functions as they related to overall success or failure. This analysis will be conducted of specific, delineated functions as they relate to C3, but owing to the far reaching scope of logistics, this paper will be limited to treating a few critical aspects of logistics as they impacted on the campaigns of Manstein and the German Army. The second chapter will introduce Manstein to the reader and highlight his accomplishments. Chapter III will deal with C3 functions as they related, supported or were used by Manstein, and the fourth chapter will deal with key logistics issues as they influenced/impacted the campaigns of Manstein. The final chapter will present some conclusions and broad lessons derived from the German experience in general.

Beyond Stalingrad

Beyond Stalingrad PDF

Author: Dana V. Sadarananda

Publisher: Praeger

Published: 1990-06-26

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13: 0275934403

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

This study fills a void in the military history of World War II by focusing attention upon individual battles and operations on the Eastern Front--a subject largely neglected in the literature. Basing his study on in-depth analysis of contemporary war diaries, author Dana Sadarananda examines Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's conduct of operations as the commander of the German Army Group Don from November 1942-March 1943. Sadarananda traces the course of the Winter campaign of 1942-43--the aftermath of the Soviet counteroffensive that trapped the German 6th Army in the city of Stalingrad--and illuminates the reasons why the Army Group Don was able to achieve a dramatic reversal of fortune and enable the German Army to regain the initiative along the critical Eastern Front. He concludes that the German successes during the period in question were largely due to the perceptive and decisive leadership of Field Marshal von Manstein. Sadarananda demonstrates that the battles that Manstein directed during the winter of 1942-43 were among the most critical of the entire war. In fact, he shows, failure to succeed would have meant the collapse of the entire Eastern front and an earlier victory for the Allies. Piecing together the course of the campaign, Sadarananda identifies four distinct phases of the operations, beginning in November 1942 when the 4th Panzer Army aborted its relieve drive on Stalingrad and culminating in the elimination of Russian forces and the German recapture of the Donets River line. Throughout, the author analyzes Manstein's military decisions as well as his relationship with Hitler during a period in which the German leader's behavior was characterized by uncertainty and indecision. Sadarananda argues that Manstein's genius was not only his ability to anticipate enemy moves but also his effectiveness in dealing with Hitler.

Opportunity In Danger: Manstein’s East Front Strategy From 19 November 1942 To 18 March 1943

Opportunity In Danger: Manstein’s East Front Strategy From 19 November 1942 To 18 March 1943 PDF

Author: Lt. Steven B. Bolstad USN

Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing

Published: 2015-11-06

Total Pages: 151

ISBN-13: 1786253143

DOWNLOAD EBOOK →

In the 1990s the United States Armed Forces will be asked by its leaders to do more with less. This represents a significant turn from the policies of the last decade. During World War Two the German Army operated effectively under similar policy constraints. There are many lessons in strategic planning that can be learned from Field Marshal Erich von Manstein’s operations during the Winter of 1942-43. He was able to grasp tremendous opportunity amid extreme strategic danger. He decisively changed the strategic situation on the Eastern Front over a four month period. This thesis addresses the following questions. What factors enabled him to operate so effectively? What hindered him? What decisions did he make, when and why? How might leaders today make similar decisions under similar circumstances and be as successful? The answers to these questions will be of great value to the United States Armed Forces as they restructure themselves for the 1990s.

Lanterna Rally - Theme by Grace Themes